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This thesis examines the implications for nuclear deterrence between the
United States and the Soviet Union brought about by the dramatic changes in the
strategic environment during the 1980s. Specifically, it examines the potential for
a new criteria of deterrence at significantly lower levels of strategic weapons. The
analysis indicates that a targeting strategy which emphasizes economic and
industrial facilities will deter the Soviet Union. This targeting strategy allows for
a reduction to 1500 strategic weapons while maintaining the robustness of nuclear
deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Using as its criteria
arms race stability, breakout stability, crisis stability, verification, predictability,
consequences of war, and the security of friends and allies, this thesis concludes
that a force structure comprised of the Trident D-5 Submarine-launched ballistic
missile and the B-2 bomber best ensures deterrence both against the Soviet Union
and any other nuclear power regardless of changes in their political or ideological
orientation. To provide maximum flexibility while negotiating the agreement and
to hedge against a breakdown in U.S./Soviet relations prior to implementation, the
thesis recommends a modernization program for U.S. strategic forces including
funding for the restructured Strategic Defense Initiative which is now named
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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Security Strategy of the United States is designed to fulfill the
following four broad interests and objectives:
• The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its
fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
• A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual
prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad.
• A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and
democratic institutions.
• Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and
friendly nations. 1
Of crucial importance is the first-the survival and freedom of the United States. If
the United States is destroyed or subjugated by another nation, the remaining
three interests and objectives are meaningless.
For the past 40 years the United States has relied on a strategy of nuclear
deterrence to ensure its freedom and survival. By the mid to late 1960s the
political leadership acknowledged that nuclear deterrence was not enhanced by
ever growing numbers of strategic nuclear weapons. 2 While total nuclear
disarmament was viewed as an unfeasible Utopia, the control of strategic weapons
^National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March
1990), pp. 2 and 3.
2Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense
Programs, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 207 and Michael Krepon, "Has Arms
Control Worked?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1989, p. 28. Hereafter, the term strategic
weapons is used for either strategic nuclear weapons or warheads.
and their associated testing was deemed as an acceptable means to maintain
or enhance nuclear deterrence.3 As a result, arms control has come to play an
important but subordinate role in preserving nuclear deterrence and U.S. national
security.
During the latter half of the 1980s attention was focused on the potential
impact of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) on nuclear deterrence.
The general consensus concerning START is that nuclear deterrence is not
adversely affected even in the worst case scenarios used to evaluate it.4 Though
START has yet to be signed by the President, let alone ratified by the Senate,
many proposals already exist for much deeper reductions in the strategic nuclear
arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.5 On the surface, these calls
may appear valid and noteworthy. But reductions for the sole purpose of
reductions is a dangerous proposition. No matter the good or bad points of the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the START processes, the strength of
nuclear deterrence remains robust. Likewise, future reductions should not
diminish the strength of nuclear deterrence and increase the likelihood of nuclear
war.
3Richard Smoke, "The Evolution of American Defense Policy," in American Defense Policy, 5th
ed., ed. John Reichart and Steven Sturm (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), pp.
117, 118; Amos A. Jordon, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, American National
Security, 3d ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 540-544; and Lawrence
Freedman, The Evolution ofNuclear Strategy, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 197-
199.
4For example see Michael M. May, George F. Bing, and John D. Steinbruner, Strategic Arms
Reductions (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988).
5"The New Nuclear Age," The Economist, 10 March 1990, pp. 11, 12; Harold A. Feiveson and
Frank N. von Hippel, "Beyond START: How to Make Much Deeper Cuts," International Security,
vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): pp 154-180; and Paul H. Nitze, "Leapfrog into START II," New York
Times, p. A-19.
The purpose of this study is to go beyond the current START proposals and to
determine a plausible START II framework which does not diminish the strength
of nuclear deterrence as it exists in 1991. As used in this study, nuclear deterrence
is equivalent to crisis stability which is presently very robust. The Soviet Union
has no incentive to launch a first strike because the United States is capable of
responding with its remaining strategic weapons in any scenario and destroying
the Soviet Union as a viable nation.
The task of looking ahead at potential futures is an important intellectual
and practical exercise. Speculating about the future helps to prepare policy
makers. It would also help them to respond to changes and the difficult questions
posed by Congress and concerned citizens about the future course of foreign and
defense policy.
For its first 12 to 18 months in office, the Bush administration appeared
unwilling or unable to consider the implications of radical changes in the
international environment. With the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, and the positive trend in Soviet-American relations, the
administration's spokesmen failed to articulate clearly the future national
security and military strategies. While the failure to grapple with these events
was rectified to some extent by the March 1990 issue of the National Security
Strategy of the United States, it was not until August 1990 that the new U.S.
national security strategy and General Colin Powell's "base" force were publicly
presented.6
^Michael R. Gordon, "New Pentagon Strategic Plan For a World After Cold War," New York
Times, 2 August 1990, p. A-l, A-12; President George Bush, "Remarks by the President to the
Aspen Institute Symposium," 2 August 1990 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Office of the
Up through the congressional hearings on the Bush administration's Fiscal
Year 1991 Defense Budget request, a strong impression was given that its
approach to the new world was to be much like the old one.7 No other factor drove
the Defense Budget except the deficit. Official projections of the Defense Budget
were not based on a clear articulation of national objectives or national security
strategy.
The Bush administration lost valuable time and political capital because it
could only defend its Defense Budget request on the basis of hedging and
prudence.8 The fact that it took 18 months to articulate a new and relatively
coherent military strategy is evidence that a future without a Cold War was never
considered by either the Reagan or Bush administrations. If it was considered, the
conclusions were likely pigeon holed, stifled, or ignored. This study hopes to
provide a contribution in preparing for one potential future involving arms control
and strategic weapons.
In the first chapter the conceptual framework for this study is established.
The methodological approach is provided by the complex forecasting model of
Press Secretary); Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, "Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney to the Institute for Strategic Studies," The Homestead, Hot Springs, VA., 6
September 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs))
and General Colin L. Powell, "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, at the 72d Annual National Convention of the American Legion, Indianapolis, Indiana, 30
August 1990," (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs))
^Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense
Appropriations Fiscal Year 1991, part 2, 101st Cong., 2d sess., pp. 311 and 312. The opening
statement of Senator Daniel Inouye, chairman of the subcommittee, makes light of the business as
usual approach of the Department of Defense regarding strategic weapons.
8For example see the opening testimony of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney before the Senate
Armed Services Committe, Department ofDefense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1991, part 1,101st Cong., 2d sess., pp 7-13.
William Ascher and William H. Overholt. Next, the chapter will layout the
assumptions which were made to provide reasonable constraints. The intent is not
to create an ideal world, which is clearly unattainable, but to examine a situation
that has its basis in reality. In addition, the criteria used to measure and evaluate
a START II are defined. The criteria are those articulated by President Bush in
the March 1990 edition of the National Security Strategy of the United States: crisis
stability, arms race stability, breakout stability, verification, predictability,
security of allies, and consequences of war. Finally, the chapter will conclude by
discussing why the United States should consider deep reductions in strategic
weapons.
The second chapter will determine the size of possible reductions by
reviewing deterrence theory and U.S. deterrence policies following World War II
and then answer the three fundamental questions about nuclear deterrence. What
Soviet targets should be held at risk? How many of those targets should be held at
risk? And what if deterrence fails? The analysis indicates that a reduction to a
level of 1500 strategic weapons is feasible and maintains or enhances U.S. national
security while providing a hedge against uncertainties. The second chapter
concludes by presenting a projection of the strategic nuclear forces available to the
United States and the Soviet Union and a number of force options available to each
in START H.
The analysis of the third chapter further substantiates the conclusion that
1500 strategic weapons are enough. Using the arms control criteria of the first
chapter each force option will be analyzed to determine which option (or options)
best enhances U.S. national security.
The final chapter considers the implications of the START II regime
formulated in the study. A significant area of concern is the costs involved for
strategic force modernization at a time of fiscal constraint. The choices made
regarding strategic force modernization during the 1990s will have a significant
influence on negotiating flexibility for START II. For example, the failure to fund
land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) modernization may preclude
the United States from pursuing that as a basing option for START II even if it is
the desired choice. Finally, it is necessary to consider the potential effects the
other three major nuclear powers may have on crisis stability with the
recommended force option in place. While a future with France, the United
Kingdom and the People's Republic of China simultaneously hostile to the United
States is unlikely, there is no margin for error. The United States requires a force
option immune to the effects that these nuclear powers may have on the strategic
balance. A force structure centering on the Trident D-5 Submarine-launched
Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and the B-2 bomber meets the most stringent
requirements of nuclear deterrence in this future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND FORECASTING
It should appear obvious that effective long-range strategic planning is
essential for developing policies and strategies which fulfill the interests and
objectives of the United States. Several methodological approaches can be used to
facilitate this planning. The specific approach utilized should be chosen based on
several desirable criteria while recognizing that there are inevitable tradeoffs
between these criteria.
First, the approach should be plausible. The analyst should be able to discard
results which have no basis in reality or are clearly incorrect. Second, the
approach should allow for results which appear counterintuitive to the premises
used. For example, the economic policy of supply side economics at first appears
counterintuitive because of its premise that cutting taxes leads to increased
government revenue. Third, the approach should be sufficiently explicit so that
other analysts can later apply it and develop the same results. Fourth, the
approach should be comprehensive in its exploration of the chosen factors; yet, it
should be as simple as possible because a simple approach is less difficult to
employ, less intimidating to those attempting to learn it, and easier to assess its
reliability and plausibility. Finally, the approach should work with existing
theory yet be sensitive to nuances.9
In addition, there are factors within the respective organization which
require consideration when choosing a methodological approach. Analysts will
tend to favor approaches that they know over those that they do not know. Efforts
are needed to ensure that an untried approach is not discarded nor ignored simply
because of unfamiliarity. However, if a new approach is used because the
forecasting problem makes it necessary to do so, then its uncertainties should be
explicitly stated so that analysts and recipients can better evaluate and
understand the results. This procedure will assist in determining whether the new
approach is useful or not. Also, the particular approach utilized will require
specific analytical skills. The analyst assigned should possess the necessary skills
to accomplish the task. Finally, the choice of any one approach will be a function of
the time and effort required before the results are complete; the data
requirements; and the manner in which the results will be communicated. 10
The approach chosen by this study to examine START II comes from the
excellent text by William Ascher and William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning
and Forecasting. They propose two models for forecasting, one in which the actor
has little control over his surrounding environment, and a more complex model
^William Ascher and William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning and Forecasting: Political Risk
and Economic Opportunity (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), pp. 61-66.
lODefense Intelligence Agency, Report DDE-2200-227-83, Methodology Catalog: An Aid to
Intelligence Analysts and Forecasters, by Joseph Peter Longo, December 1983, pp 1-5 through 1-7.
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consisting of a strong actor who has the ability to influence his environment to
varying degrees. The complex forecasting model is shown in Figure l. 11
The first step in using the model is to determine, list, and rank the national
interests of concern. This task is obviously not as easy as it sounds since few people
usually agree on the relative priority of any interest or the necessary tradeoffs
between them. The second step is to describe the future environments. As shown
in Figure 1, the model uses three types of environments: core, environment I
through n (I through HI shown for brevity), and exogenous. This concept of the
total environment demonstrates a recognition that a strong actor with specific
interests has various degrees of influence over his surrounding environment
ranging from a great deal to practically none. The core environment is that
portion of the total environment that is either stable or which the actor can
exercise great control over relative to his interests. The portions identified as
environments (envir) I through EH, together called the basic environment, are
those environments that are distinct from each other and from the core and over
which the actor has less control. The outer portion, identified as exogenous,
consists of those contingencies which do not fit into any of the constructed
environments; in otherwords, the unexpected or unpredicted.
To meet the actor's needs for this complex situation, a three-part strategy is
designed. The first strategy is the core strategy and is designed to handle only the
core environment. The core strategy is supplemented by a basic strategy which is





Ascher and Overholt Complex Forecasting Model
SOURCE: William Ascher and William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning and Forecasting:
Political Risks and Economic Opportunity (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), pp. 21-
41.
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designed to influence the respective surrounding environments towards the actor's
preferred environment. Finally, a hedging strategy is included to handle the
unforeseen contingencies not covered by the other two strategies.
The model in Figure 1 reflects a sophisticated view of alternative futures and
how to formulate the means to handle them. It recognizes that the potential
futures for a strong actor like the United States range from those which it can
influence to those over which it has little or no influence.
For the purposes of this study, the Soviet Union remains the core
environmental actor of concern. The other nuclear powers and the known
emerging nuclear powers exist in environments I through n. The unknown radical
states which may procure nuclear weapons exist in the exogenous environment.
The core national interest of concern is the continued survival and freedom of the
United States. The policy utilized to meet that national interest is nuclear
deterrence. Thus, the goal is to determine the lowest number of strategic weapons
which can exist in START II while maintaining the robustness of nuclear
deterrence. The model in Figure 1 represents the conceptual framework guiding
this study and its projection of the future core environment with the Soviet Union.
Once the projection is complete and a feasible core strategy formulated, as
operationalized by the recommended force options for START II, the question as to
what degree this core strategy works for the other environments will be addressed.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
First, START I could be signed and ratified in either 1991 or 1992 and fully
implemented by the year 1998 or 1999. At the Washington Summit in June 1990,
the Soviet Union and the United States made a commitment to commence talks
11
regarding future reductions once START I is ratified.! 2 As a result, a START II
could be ready for signature by the year 2000 and fully implemented between 2008
and 2010. Scrapping the current START regime for talks on deeper reductions, as
proposed by Paul Nitze, is a destabilizing concept. 13 Though this proposal appears
on the surface to have validity, it is not in the best interest of either party. The
most important aspect of START and follow-on agreements is verification. The
verification regime in START will be the most comprehensive and intrusive in the
history of either nation. 14 There will be snags and misunderstandings to work out;
both nations will have to achieve a degree of cooperation never before attempted.
Trying to go to far in a short period of time could cause discord between the two
nations. Time is needed for the United States and the Soviet Union to develop a
more harmonious relationship. For example, the strength of the special
relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom took several
decades to develop.
Second, even with the recent positive trend in Soviet-American relations, the
Soviet Union will remain the most likely adversary in a nuclear war. 40 years of
animosity will not disappear overnight. START II must be framed with that
reality in mind. Once formulated, START II can then be evaluated in terms of the
other three existing major nuclear powers (United Kingdom, France, People's
Republic of China) and any emerging nuclear powers. The agreement reached will
l2Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing
Strategic Stability, 1 June 1990, (Washington, DC: The White House, 1 June 1990).
i3Nitze, "Leapfrog into START II."
14Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, 1 June 1990, (Washington, D.C.:
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA), June 1990).
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be bilateral in nature. The other three major nuclear powers have indicated that
they will not participate in arms control talks which include their strategic
nuclear forces. A willingness to participate in later negotiations may exist only
after deep reductions are made by the United States and the Soviet Union. 15
Third, a smaller number of strategic weapons is able to maintain the
extended deterrence of Europe. Rough strategic parity between the United States
and the Soviet Union has existed since the SALT I Interim Agreement on Strategic
Offensive Arms entered force on 3 October 1972. Even with the expansionistic
tendencies of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Western Europe
and the United States were not attacked by the Soviet Union. The lack of war
suggests that two factors are important for the extended deterrence of Europe. The
first factor is the uncertainty involved in any large scale war between the United
States and the Soviet Union. The possibility of escalation to large scale use of
strategic weapons is inherent to any conflict between the two superpowers if
theater or battlefield nuclear weapons are present. The second factor is the
existence of enough strategic weapons which can carry out an assured destruction
attack. If these two factors are maintained, then a smaller number of strategic
weapons will not adversely affect extended deterrence. 16
15Robert S. Norris and others, "Nuclear Weapons," in SIPR1 Yearbook 1989: World Armaments
and Disarmaments (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 29, 33 and Robert S. Norris and
others, "Nuclear Weapons," in S1PRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmaments (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.40, 46.
16This assumption is derived from the excellent review of the three schools of thought
concerning strategic nuclear deterrence by Charles Glaser, "Why Do Strategists Disagree about the
Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence," in Nuclear Arguments, ed. Lynn Eden and Steven
E. Miller (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 109-171 and this author's review of the
various sources cited therein.
13
Fourth, nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will remain
explicitly unconstrained in START II due to the difficulties and costs (primarily
operational) of verification. 17 The general provisions of START I regarding
annual declarations of numbers will continue. The total number ofnuclear SLCMs
will number less than 880. Nonnuclear cruise missiles will be unconstrained by
START H.
Fifth, the counting rules for START II will be relatively simple. The actual
number of warheads carried by each bomber, submarine, or land-based missile will
count. The limit and sublimits in START II will apply equally to both the United
States and the Soviet Union. Within any sublimit, each side can arrange their
forces in a manner suitable to their interests. For example, if a sublimit of 1000
warheads exists for silo-based ICBMs, each side could deploy any number and
variety of silo-based ICBMs as long as the total number of warheads does not
exceed 1000. In addition, two to three ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in
overhaul or restricted availability in shipyards will not count against ballistic
missile sublimits since SSBNs are unable to launch strategic weapons in those
conditions. 18 In addition, only those bombers actually available for alert would
17 Dr. Edward L. Warner, a senior defense analyst in the RAND Corporation, discussed these
problems during testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee See Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, The Future of U.S. -Soviet Relations, 101st Cong., 1st sess., April-June 1989,
p. 599.
18Current START I proposals reportedly allow two to three SSBNs in overhaul or restricted
shipyard availability to not count against ballistic missile sublimits. This portion of the START 1
regime is assumed to carry over into START II. See Senate Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations Fiscal Year 1991, part 3, 101st
Cong., 2d sess., p. 358 and Senate Armed Services Committee, Department ofDefense Authorization
for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991, part 7, 101st Cong., 2d sess., p. 87.
14
count against any limits. Those in long term maintenance or used for training
purposes would not count.
Finally, the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty will remain in effect as
signed in 1972 and modified in 1974. Only one ABM site can exist and must be
located to defend either the national capital (Soviet Union) or ICBM silo launchers
(United States).i9
C. START II CRITERIA
Arms control is a subordinate part of the national security problem and must
be considered, framed, and pursued in that context. A "good" arms control
agreement is worthless if it makes the nation less secure. At best, START II
should enhance national security. At worst, START II should have a neutral
effect. The National Security Strategy of the United States suggests several criteria
to use in judging a potential START II agreement.
First, START II should foster crisis stability. Minimal incentives for the
Soviet Union to launch a first strike should exist on a day-to-day basis. The key
factor is the survival of at least 750 American strategic weapons which are capable
of retaliation. This measure assumes that a START II is in place and that no
breakout by Soviet strategic weapons constrained in the agreement is in progress.
If 750 strategic weapons survive which are capable of retaliating, crisis stability
exists. If less than 750 strategic warheads survive which are capable of
retaliating, crisis stability does not exist.
19National Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Arms Control: Background and Issues (Washington,
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1985), Appendix C.
15
Second, the agreement should foster arms race stability. The agreement
should not encourage the Soviet Union to quicken the development and
deployment of unconstrained weapons to counter the effects of a START n. This
measure is purely a qualitative assessment and the author's projection based on
the trends in technological advances.
Third, the treaty should promote breakout stability. The American strategic
nuclear force should have the ability to survive with 750 strategic weapons under
any circumstances. 750 strategic weapons provides for the flexibility to launch
strikes of a few warheads up to an assured destruction attack. If no breakout is
needed to reduce the survivability of the American force to below 750 warheads, or
if a doubling of Soviet strategic weapons does not prevent the survival of one-half
the American force, then breakout stability exists. Breakout stability does not
exist if an increase in Soviet strategic weapons of up to 50 percent reduces the
survivability of the American force to 750 warheads.
Fourth, predictability regarding the size, nature, and evolution of Soviet
strategic nuclear forces should be enhanced. This predictability allows for
strategic planners to have a better grasp of the potential problems in the future by
reducing uncertainty about the status of Soviet strategic nuclear forces.
Fifth, adequate verification is a must. Verification should act to reduce the
incentives for breakout. It should provide adequate indication time for the United
States to take action before the Soviet Union gains the capability to destroy one-
half of the American strategic weapons.
Sixth, should a war involving the use of nuclear weapons occur, its
consequences to the United States should be constrained to the greatest extent
16
possible as related to the objectives in the wartime environment. It is an American
historical tendency to view war or conflict as an aberration and not as a
continuation of policy using other means. As a result, when the United States does
engage in a war or conflict, it tends to do so reluctantly and couches its goals in
moral tones: World War I-make the world safe for democracy, the war to end wars;
World War II-the four freedoms; and the Gulf War-free Kuwait from Iraqi
oppression.20 Also, the American tendency is towards limiting the casualties
suffered by American military forces to the minimum necessary to attain victory.
The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; while also
motivated by other factors including revenge for Pearl Harbor, latent racism, and
the potential for diplomatic leverage with the Soviet Union;2l was primarily
justified by its early ending of the war and preventing the horrendous casualties
anticipated from an invasion of the Japanese home islands.22 The latest example
of the American tendency to limit its losses is the GulfWar where great emphasis
was placed on technology and firepower as substitutes for American blood.
Finally, the strength of collective security between the United States and its
friends and allies should not be reduced as a result of START II. A cornerstone of
U.S. security policy in the years since World War II is the concept of collective
security. Strong military alliances and economic relations with friendly nations
have served to protect their interests as well as those of the United States.
20Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, 2d ed., (New York: Harper &
Row, 1965), pp. 23-27.
21Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Policy: A
History (Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Company, 1977), pp. 429-435.
220ne should consider the American and Japanese casualties suffered during the island
invasions up to and including Iwo Jima and Okinawa. On Okinawa alone over 100,000 Japanese
17
Collective security facilitates communications among nations, improves the
integration of various military forces through joint training and exercises, and
provides a demonstration of U.S. commitment to friends. The strength of collective
security remains important even with the end of the Cold War. Its importance was
most recently demonstrated by the coalition forged by President Bush to confront
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. A reduction in strategic weapons must not reduce the
strength of collective security.23
D. SOVIET AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN REDUCTIONS
For an arms control agreement to be ratified and implemented, a sufficient
convergence of interests must exist between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The interests of the two nations for arms control can be divided into three
competitive categories: political, military, and economic.
died while over 20,000 Americans were killed or wounded. These figures did not give much comfort
to the American leadership when considering the anticipated costs of the planned Kyushu and
Honshu invasions. Whether other diplomatic or economic means could have ended the war with
Japan as quickly if not sooner remains a subject of debate. However, even after the atomic bombs
were dropped and the surrender decree issued by the Emperor, it still took his personal
intervention to ensure compliance by the military. See Alvin D. Coox, "The Effectiveness of the
Japanese Military Establishment in the Second World War," in Military Effectiveness, vol. 3, The
Second World War, ed. Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp.
19, 32-34; Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's Navy (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 327, 328;
Robert W. Love, Jr., "Fighting a Global War, 1941-1945," in In Peace and War: Interpretations of
Naval History, 1775-1978, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 285,
286; and Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1977), pp. 310, 311.
^National Security Strategy, p. 26; Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress,
Fiscal Year 1990, (Washington, DC.: GPO, 1989), p. 49; Department of Defense, Annual Report to
the President and the Congress, January 1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), pp. 5, 6; and
Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, January 1991
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), pp. 8, 9.
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These interests are called competitive because while positive benefits may
accrue in one category, another category could accrue negative benefits. This is
one way to view the Washington Naval Conference of November 1921 through
February 1922. Politically an argument can be made that the agreements made at
the conference were beneficial to the United States. The Anglo-Japanese alliance
was abolished in the Four Power Treaty and the Open Door policy for China was
endorsed in the Nine Power Treaty. However, militarily an argument can be made
that the agreements had a negative impact. Submarines, cruisers, and destroyers
were not limited, allowing an arms race in those categories, and the United States
pledged not to further fortify its Pacific possessions.24
In addition, as Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin pointed out in a
classic work in the field, arms control agreements do not necessarily provide
monetary savings:
If both sides can profit from improved communications, from more expensive
military forces that are less prone to accident, from expensive redeployments
that minimize the danger of misinterpretation and false alarms, arms control
may cost more, not less.25
24paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, American Foreign Policy, pp. 339-341 and Walter LaFeber,
The American Age (New York: WW. Norton and Company, 1989), pp. 320-323.
25Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: The
Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 2.
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While this statement was written 30 years ago it remains valid today.26 In
response to a question regarding whether monetary savings should still serve as a
criterion, Schelling responded:
If there are arms controls, formal or informal, that promise to reduce military
costs significantly and not impede the achievement of other objectives, such
cost reduction would be a sufficient reason to proceed.... we emphasized that
arms control might well entail greater outlays. Second-strike weapons could
be more costly than first-strike ones. Measures that reduce the likelihood of
the use of nuclear weapons might necessitate outlays for conventional forces.
More reliable systems of surveillance and warning, and command and control,
which are required by arms control pacts, or are in the spirit of arms control,
may be expensive.... Arms control that raised costs would not violate a
criterion; it would merely, if successful, achieve objectives worth the money.27
An arms control agreement or lack thereof requires tradeoffs between the three
categories of interests. An early decision is required as to the importance of each
and the negotiating approach of the United States formulated accordingly.
1. Soviet Interests in START II
Since the advent to power in 1985 of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet
Union has gone through a significant period of change. The concepts of perestroika
and glasnost have evolved out of the realization that the economic situation in the
Soviet Union is a shambles and must be dealt with if the Soviet Union is to remain
a viable empire.
Recognizing that the ability to compete with the West over the long term
required an inward focus, Gorbachev has promoted internal change and openness
26Barry M. Blechman, "Cost Reduction Dubious," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1989,
pp. 38, 39; Edward L. Warner and David A. Ochmarek, Next Moves (New York: Council on Foreign
Affairs, 1989), pp. 5,6.
27Thomas Schelling, "From An Airport Bench," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1989,
p. 29.
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in order to rebuild and improve the Soviet economy and society. This inward focus
suggests an attempt to gain a sort of "breathing space" in its competition with the
West. If the fundamental aspects of the Communist ideology and Russian
historical tendencies are not altered, then the long term aim of the Soviet Union is
presumably to come back onto the world scene as a more capable and robust world
power. However, this goal of improving the economy and society remains valid
regardless of the orientation of the political leadership.
Gorbachev and his supporters have come to realize that the elements of
national power include the economy, social/political development, and ideological
approach as well as military capability. The improvement and restructuring of the
other elements of national power requires the availability of resources. The most
likely source of these resources are those committed to the military sector. START
I and II would provide one means of freeing up these resources for the economy.
Politically, a START I and II would provide evidence to the world that
the Soviet Union is a reliable participant in international affairs. The positive
political benefits for the Soviet Union's cooperative and relatively benign attitude
with the Western nations over the past one to two years are evident in the Persian
Gulf. The Soviet Union has achieved a diplomatic involvement in that region
which it never before possessed.28 Furthermore, the lack of an overt Soviet threat
has essentially stopped all nuclear and nonnuclear force modernization in NATO.
Finally, even the Soviet crackdown in Lithuania, while condemned by President
28John M. Goshko, "Soviets want to join U.S. as Mideast peace-talk sponsors," The Monterey
Herald, 26 April 1991, p. 2A.
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Bush, resulted in no significant countermeasures by the United States.29 Bellicose
actions directed at the United States through the mid-1980s did not provide many
benefits for the Soviet Union while cooperation has.
Militarily the Soviet Union has much to gain through a START I and II.
Resources for the improvement of conventional forces may become more available.
As a result, their relative capability and quality could increase with lower
numbers of strategic weapons. In addition, the shape and evolution of American
forces could become more predictable in START I and n.
2. American Interests in START II
One observation is immediately required. The above discussion
regarding the arms control interests of the Soviet Union are in general applicable
to the United States. The arms control criteria for START II discussed earlier
address most of the military and political aspects of the American interests. Using
a cooperative approach, even with a competitor or foe, will likely provide the
United States more benefits than a win or lose approach. For example, France
does not have the level of friendship with the United States as does the United
Kingdom. However, even during the most serious of disagreements, both the
United States and France have found cooperation, however reluctant, more
beneficial.
29Michael Wines, "Bush Deplores Soviet Crackdown But takes No Steps in Response," New
York Times, 14 January 1991, p. A-l, 7; "Bush Statement on Lithuania," New York Times, 14
January 1991, p. A- 7; and Maureen Dowd, "White House Sticks to its Subdued Reaction to Baltic
Crackdown," New York Times, 15 January 1991, p. A-7.
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The conclusion that cooperation is better for both the United States and
the Soviet Union is supported by President Bush in the National Security Strategy
of the United States:
Our goal is to move beyond containment, to seek the integration of the Soviet
Union into the international system as a constructive partner.... The United
States will seek to engage the USSR in a relationship that is increasingly
cooperative. Moscow will find us a willing partner in creating conditions that
will permit the Soviet Union to join, and be welcome in, a peaceful, free, and
prosperous international community.... We look for fundamental alterations in
Soviet institutions and practices that can only be reversed at great economic
and political costs.... In the military sphere, with agreements in place-and
weapons destroyed, production lines converted, and forces demobilized-any
future Soviet leadership (i.e., friendly or hostile) would find it costly, time-
consuming, and difficult to renew the pursuit of military supremacy and
impossible to attempt without providing ample strategic warning.30
As further noted by Edward L. Warner and David Ochmarek in their book Next
Moves:
The successful conclusion of major arms control agreements, such as the SALT
agreements and the ABM treaty, and sustained compliance with them,
generally has had a positive "spillover" effect on the broader East-West
political relationship. Advances in the bilateral arms control process can
encourage cooperation in other areas, including crisis avoidance and crisis
management, expanded economic and cultural relations, and, importantly,
mutual restraint in regional conflicts. 31
The recent example of restraint and cooperation by the Soviet Union
with the United States occurred during the recent Gulf Crisis and War. The United
States was able to remove most of its combat capability from Europe with little or
no public concern. The numerous United Nations resolutions promoted by the
30National Security Strategy, pp. 9,10.
31 Warner and Ochmarek, Next Moves, p. 5.
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United States were not vetoed or unduly hampered by Soviet actions. And
although there were some last minute Soviet peace overtures to Iraq, many of the
European nations, most notably France, also made last minute overtures. Could
the United States have responded as vigorously as it did in the crisis and war with
Iraq if the Soviet Union was still the uncooperative *Evil Empire' of the 1980s?
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III. FORMULATING THE START II LIMITS
With the framework of the study established this chapter will determine the
potential strategic force reductions in START n. The first section provides an
historical overview of deterrence theory and U.S. deterrence policies since World
War II. The second section continues this process by addressing the three enduring
questions of nuclear deterrence for the Soviet Union in 2005-2010. The final two
sections will focus on the strategic forces which the United States and Soviet
Union can use in creating a number of potential force options in a START II
regime.
A. DETERRENCE: THEORY AND DECLARATORY POLICY
The deterrence policies of the United States following World War II can be
placed within two historical eras. The first era, that of Massive Retaliation, existed
from 1945 to the start of the Kennedy administration. The second era, that of
Flexible Response, started with the Kennedy administration and continues today.
Within both eras, U.S. policies have oscillated between responding symmetrically
and asymmetrically to the Soviet threat.32 At times the U.S. feels able to play its
strength against Soviet weaknesses. At other times the U.S. tries to match Soviet
strengths. During the era of Massive Retaliation, except for the momentary
conventional buildup during the Korean War, the United States tried to play its
32John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American
National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
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strength of nuclear weapons against the conventional and geographic strengths of
the Soviet Union. In a general war with the Soviet Union the United States would
use its nuclear weapons in an all out bombing campaign similar to those in World
War II.33 Because of the U.S nuclear superiority and the uncertainty surrounding
the potential American use of nuclear weapons, Massive Retaliation, and its
instrument the Strategic Air Command (SAC), was generally a bold and effective
policy which attempted to match means to ends without bankrupting the United
States.
However, with the perceived and projected decline in U.S. nuclear superiority
by the end of the 1950s, there was increasingly more debate and discussion as to
whether Massive Retaliation could still maintain nuclear deterrence. As a result,
most ofthe modern thinking on deterrence came to fruition in the late 1950s in the
writings of such individuals as William Kaufmann, Herman Kahn, and Glenn
Snyder.
As one part of the interaction between entities from individuals to states,
deterrence is a concept as old as established history. It exists at any level of
interaction. Deterrence can be thought of as the caution one entity shows in the
face ofsome superior power. As defined by Glenn Snyder:
...deterrence may follow, first, from any form of control which one has over an
opponents present and prospective value 'inventory'; secondly from the
33Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Evaluation of Current Strategic Air Offensive Plans (JCS 1952/1)," in
Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and the Future, 2d ed., ed. P. Edward Haley and Jack Merrit
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 47-49 and David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of
Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," in Strategy and Nuclear
Deterrence, ed. Steven E. Miller (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 113-181.
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communication of a credible threat or promise to decrease or increase that
inventory; and, thirdly, from the opponent's degree of confidence that one
intends to fulfill that threat or promise.34
In simpler terms the goal of deterrence is to prevent or keep an adversary from
carrying out a particular action by communicating to that adversary what the
likely costs will be. The expectation is that the adversary will be deterred from
carrying out that action as long as less intolerable choices exist.35 In the context of
nations interacting with each other there are three general tools available for
deterrence: military force including the use of general purpose forces or alliances;
economic force including the use of trade restrictions or embargoes; and diplomatic
force including the granting of recognition or the ending of diplomatic relations. 36
The various tools of deterrence suggests that several deterrence orientations
can exist. Kaufmann divides deterrence orientation into two area-punishment or
reward. Punishment results when some form of costs are inflicted onto an
adversary after he carries out the action which the recipient nation finds negative
to its interests. Snyder, focussing in his work on the military realm, classifies
deterrence by punishment as anytime nuclear weapons are utilized. 37 Rewards
are an attempt to offer the adversary some positive benefit for not carrying out a
particular action. Kaufmann is careful to distinguish deterrence by reward from
34Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), p.
10.
35William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," in Military Policy and National
Security, ed. William W. Kaufmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 17.
36Snyder, Deterrence, pp. 9, 1 and Kaufmann, "Requirements of Deterrence," pp. 29 32.
37Snyder, Deterrence, p. 8.
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the policy of appeasement by arguing that their are some areas where adversaries
may have mutual interests. However, deterrence by reward can only succeed if the
potential adversary desires to maintain the status quo, offers some concessions in
return, or when the recipient nation can take back its concessions.38 A third area
of deterrence is denial. Deterrence by denial is the use of force to prevent an
adversary from successfully occupying territory.39 In the nuclear age Snyder
assigns the role of deterrence by denial to general purpose forces because of the
high costs associated with the use of nuclear weapons.
Deterrence can be categorized into three types. Herman Kahn defined these
as Type I, II, and HI:
Type I Deterrence is the deterrence of direct attack. It is widely believed that if
the United States were directly attacked, its response would be automatic and
unthinking. The British call this "passive deterrence" on the plausible, but
possibly incorrect, assumption that it requires no act of will to respond to a
violation. Type II Deterrence is defined as using strategic threats to engage in
very provocative acts, other than a direct attack on the United States itself.
The British call this "active deterrence" because it clearly takes an act of will
to initiate. Type III Deterrence might be called "tit-for-tat," graduated, or
controlled deterrence. It refers to acts that are deterred because the potential
aggressor is afraid that the defender or others will then take limited actions,
military or nonmilitary, that will make the aggression unprofitable, (italics in
original)4 *)
Kaufmann takes Kahn's Type I and Type n deterrence and groups them as
contingencies of the last resort. These contingencies consists of "an attack on areas
which have come to be regarded as of vital interest to us, Communist use of nuclear
38Kaufmann, "Requirements of Deterrence," p. 31, 32.
39Snyder, Deterrence, pp. 14,15.
"^Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War
, 2d ed., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1961), p. 126.
28
weapons, and those enemy actions which demonstrate there is a clear and present
danger to U.S. society."41 Beyond these contingencies are what Kaufmann calls
the peripheral areas.
A credible deterrence policy has three components.42 The first component
requires that the forces assigned the deterrence mission have the capability to
carry out the threat. For example, the threat of an effective nuclear retaliatory
strike requires survivable nuclear forces. SSBNs are highly credible for this
mission because of their ability to remain undetected in the oceans. The second
component requires that the threat promise greater costs than what the opponent
can reasonably expect to gain in benefits from the aggression. The final and most
important component of credibility is intentions. Does the recipient nation
actually intend to carry out on its threat and are these intentions successfully
communicated. An adversary has three sources of information on which to base its
judgment of U.S. intentions.
The first source is the U.S. record of previous actions in similar
circumstances. A threatened course of action consistent with recent behavior is
likely to have more credibility than one which represents a sharp break with
tradition. For example, there was intensely negative allied reaction to the
possibility that the United States would use atomic weapons during the Korean
conflict for the simple fact that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were obliterated only a
few years earlier.4 3 Had the United States made a similar threat against Iraq in
41 Kaufmann, "Requirements of Deterrence," p. 29.
42This discussion on credibility is derived from Kaufmann, "Requirements of Deterrence," pp.
18-25.
43Clay Blair, The Forgotten War (New York: Times Books, 1987), pp. 522, 523, 533.
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1991, the threat would have had little credibility because of the history of U.S.
nuclear inaction in the peripheral areas since 1945.
The second source is the statements and behavior of the U.S. government.
The credibility of any U.S. deterrence policy will depend to a large degree on the
consistency of the statements, speeches, and actions of U.S. officials regarding that
particular policy. If there is inconsistent behavior among the major leaders of
government, it is possible that mixed and confusing signals will be sent to the
adversary.
The final source is both domestic and allied public opinion. Given the
democratic nature of the United States and its emphasis on collective security, any
deterrence policy will suffer a loss in credibility if allied and domestic public
opinion do not support it.
The difficulty with deterrence, as the critics of Massive Retaliation pointed
out, is the chance that the adversary may challenge the United States to carry out
its threat. In the case of Massive Retaliation, this challenge would leave the
United States in a difficult position. The United States would have to either
initiate nuclear war and suffer those consequences or face a loss of prestige, the
decrease in capability to initiate future deterrence policies, and give
encouragement to the adversary to take further actions.44 Thus, the criticism of
Massive Retaliation focussed on its perceived lack of flexibility and credibility.
The criticism of Massive Retaliation found favor with a Kennedy
administration seeking to distance itself from the policies of its predecessor. The
era of and search for Flexible Response had commenced. Seeing Massive
44Kaufmann, "Requirements of Deterrence,"p. 18.
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Retaliation as a one option war plan, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
attempted to answer the question of what deters the Soviet Union. His solution
during the early years of the Kennedy administration was the policy of Damage
Limitation. This policy had two aims: the targeting of Soviet military forces in
order to minimize their capability to launch a powerful second strike against
American cities; and a large enough contingent of American strategic reserve
forces capable of destroying Soviet urban society.45 The policy's goal as stated in a
speech given by McNamara to the NATO Council in 1962 was "to preserve the
fabric as well as the integrity of allied society."46 This concept of deterrence was
possible given the American superiority in strategic weapons. In several speeches
and writings McNamara stated that nuclear strategy must be viewed in the same
manner that conventional war had always been. This reevaluation of thought was
contrary to the view, most notably articulated by Bernard Brodie, that nuclear
weapons had fundamentally changed the character of military strategy.47
Yet, in one important respect McNamara did not differ from Brodie. He
considered the target of ultimate value in any country to be its urban society.
According to McNamara the destruction of an urban society (one-fourth the
45Scott Sagan, Moving Targets - Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 28, 29.
46Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, "Speech to NATO Council, Athens, 5 May 1962," in
U.S. Nuclear Strategy, ed. Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory Treverton (New York:
New York University Press, 1989), p. 206.
47Bernard Brodie, "The Atomic Bomb and American Security," in U.S. Nuclear Strategy, ed.
Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory Treverton (New York: New York University
Press, 1989), pp. 64-94.
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population and one-half the industrial capacity) would take generations to recover
from.48 Thus, this society was naturally what each country must value the most.
McNamara repudiated Damage Limitation by 1963 because it was no longer
deemed feasible. In his posture statement to Congress for 1963 he stated that "it
will become increasingly difficult to destroy a sufficiently large proportion of he
Soviet's strategic nuclear forces to preclude major damage to the United States,
regardless of how large or what kind of strategic forces we build."49 He believed
that the continuation of Damage Limitation would call for a costly strategic arms
race which would divert funds away from the buildup in conventional forces
desired by the Kennedy administration. As a result, McNamara formulated the
new deterrence policy of Assured Destruction. What deterred according to
McNamara were secure second-strike forces capable of performing the mission of
assured destruction.50
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is the policy of Assured Destruction
applied by McNamara to the strategic thinking of both the United States and the
Soviet Union. The concept of assured destruction required the capability to absorb
a surprise attack and survive with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage
on the Soviet Union. Assured destruction assumed that the Soviet Union was
deterred by a fear ofdevastating nuclear retaliation which would destroy its urban
society. MAD assumed that both superpowers were deterred by this fear but that
in the interests of deterrence each would still leave itself vulnerable to retaliation.
48Sagan, Moving Targets, pp. 32, 33.
49P. Edward Haley and Jack Merrit, "The Years of Plenty," in Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control,
and the Future, 2d ed., (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p.61.
50Ibid.
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While commonly called MAD, this policy was never accepted by the Soviet Union
as its deterrence policy. MAD was a repudiation of McNamara's earlier damage
limiting strategy which sought to limit losses to the population and industry in the
event of war by destroying Soviet strategic forces. 5 1 Thus, as Gregory Treverton
suggests, the idea was that "killing weapons is bad, killing people is good."52
The Nixon administration entered office in 1969 facing the same problem
confronting John Kennedy in 1961, current nuclear strategy was perceived as
lacking credibility and the capability to ensure deterrence, especially in NATO.
Assured Destruction was seen as a single option strategy giving the President only
two choices in a nuclear war: surrender or face complete destruction from Soviet
retaliation in response to the American assured destruction strike. Both options
were deemed unacceptable.53 By 1972, the Defense Department began to study
ways to change American strategy to provide more usable nuclear options while
leaving an assured destruction capability as a last resort. This resulted in
President Nixon's National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242 of
January 1974 as conceived by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.
NSDM 242 differed from McNamara's policy of Assured Destruction in
several key areas. First, Schlesinger believed that the Soviet leadership held its
ability to recover and control Soviet society in the aftermath of a nuclear war as
51 Gregory Treverton, "From No Cities to Stable Vulnerability," in U.S. Nuclear Strategy, ed.
Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory Treverton (New York: New York University
Press, 1989), p. 196.
52Ibid.,p.200.
53Sagan, Moving Targets, pp. 39-41 and Philip Bobbitt, "Selective Options and Limited
Response, 1974 - 1983," in U.S. Nuclear Strategy, ed. Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and
Gregory Treverton (New York: New York University Press, 1989), p. 339.
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vitally important. Deterrence was best strengthened by threatening this recovery
and control through the use of Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs). By giving the
President more usable options, the credibility of a potential U.S. nuclear strike
was supposedly enhanced in case of limited Soviet nuclear strikes or a massive
Soviet conventional attack in Europe. Should deterrence fail, escalation control
was sought through the practice of self-restraint by both sides; in otherwords, the
self-imposed withholding of nuclear strikes. The Schlesinger Doctrine was a step
back towards the warfighting strategies of McNamara's early years: Damage
Limitation and City Avoidance. The goal was to provide enough time for the
United States and the Soviet Union to minimize escalation and maintain a general
war at some level below the all out spasm inherent to a policy of Assured
Destruction.54
The second major difference involved the targeting for the assured
destruction (reserve) forces of the United States. Under McNamara cities and
population were emphasized. Under NSDM 242 the focus shifted to the destruction
of 70 percent of the Soviet industrial base and make the Soviet Union's recovery
slower than that of the United States following a nuclear exchange. Because of the
emphasis on slowing Soviet recovery, NSDM 242 was known as the
Counterrecovery Strategy. However, though the language used by Nixon and
Schlesinger was different and deemphasized assured destruction, the percentage of
total warheads devoted to urban industrial targets actually increased from 16
54Sagan, Moving Targets, pp. 42-44 and Desmond Ball, "Counterforce Targeting: How New?
How Viable?" in The Race for Security, ed. Robert Scott (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1987),
p. 123.
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percent under McNamara to 50 percent under Schlesinger. NSDM 242 was in some
ways as much a strategy of assured destruction as McNamara's. 55
This trend towards warfighting and damage limitation continued through
the Carter and Reagan Presidencies. Under Carter, Presidential Directive (PD) 59
was signed. PD 59 had three objectives: flexible response, escalation control, and
war termination on the lowest possible level at terms favorable to the United
States. PD 59 was known as the Countervailing Strategy. According to Secretary
of Defense Harold Brown it shifted American emphasis towards an ability which
"would exact a prohibitively high price from the things the Soviet leadership prizes
most-political and military control, nuclear and conventional military force, and
the economic base to sustain a war."56
Early in the Reagan administration with the signing of National Security
Decision Document (NSDD) 13, the trend of PD 59 was continued with little
difference except to give increased emphasis to fighting a protracted nuclear war,
ensuring the endurance of Command, Control, and Communications, and placing
the Soviet political and military leadership at risk. 57 According to Richard
Halloran the six missions necessary to accomplish the Countervailing Strategy
were articulated in the 1982 Defense Guidance:
55Sagan, Moving Targets, pp. 44 - 48.
56Department of Defense, Department ofDefense Annual Report, FY 1982, (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1981), p. 40. For further discussion see Walter Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy," in
Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, ed Steven E. Miller (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1984), pp. 245-254; Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, "Newport Address," in U.S. Nuclear
Strategy, ed. Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory Treverton (New York: New York
University Press, 1989), pp. 412- 414; and Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear
Dilemma, 2d ed., (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 228.
57Ball, "Counterforce Targeting," p. 124.
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• Promote deterrence by being convincingly capable of responding to a first
strike in such a way as to deny the Soviets (or any other adversary) their
political and military objectives.
• Minimize the extent to which Soviet nuclear threats could be used in a crisis
to coerce the United States and our allies.
• Maintain the capacity to support Allied commitments.
• Should deterrence fail, deny the Soviet Union (or any other adversary) a
military victory at any level of conflict and force earliest termination of
hostilities on terms favorable to the United States.
• Limit Damage, by active and passive measures, to the United States and its
allies.
• Maintain in reserve, under all circumstances, nuclear offensive capabilities
so that the United States would never emerge from a nuclear war without
nuclear weapons while still threatened by enemy nuclear forces.58
These missions reflect the rationale for the modernization of American strategic
nuclear forces started during the Carter administration and continued at a faster
pace during the Reagan administration.
Two years of the Bush administration have not produced any radical or
significant changes in the deterrence orientation of the United States. While
significant progress has been made towards completing START I and the pace of
strategic force modernization has slowed, the Countervailing Strategy remains
58Richard Halloran, To Arm a Nation: Rebuilding Americas Endangered Defenses (New York:
MacMillan, 1986), pp. 282 - 283. While the Defense Guidance is a classified document, Halloran's
assertion is both implicitly and explicitly supported by Department of Defense annual reports and
other sources. See Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy," Department of Defense, Annual
Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1983 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), pp. 1-17 through 1-19,
Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1990, pp. 34-37, and Department of Defense,
Annual Report, January 1991, pp. 51-60.
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U.S. policy. Table 1 summarizes the history of U.S. deterrence policies and their
growing complexity in the quest for credibility and flexibility.
B. DETERMINING THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS
Determining the number of strategic nuclear weapons is a three step process
answering the questions "What deters?"; "How much is enough?"; and "What if
deterrence fails?" It is fair to say that in the past, U.S. nuclear deterrence policy
has emphasized a range of potential targets. Nuclear targeting has always
consisted of four basic target groups. What has changed over time is the relative
emphasis given to each target group.59 Table 2 lists some examples of targets
within each group.
In more recent testimony before Congress regarding the B-2 bomber, General
John Chain, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC),
defined three target categories: hard targets, soft targets, and mobile targets.
Hard targets include ICBM silos, Launch Control Centers (LCCs), and command
posts. Soft or area targets consist of defensive systems, airfields and submarine
bases, factory complexes, and communication and economic networks. Mobile
targets include aircraft, mobile missile launchers, surface navies, and armies out
of garrison.60
In many ways, this division of potential targets is most useful when
considering the effectiveness of various strategic weapons. Some strategic
59Scott Sagan, Moving Targets, pp. 28, 29 and Jeffrey Richelson, "The Dilemmas of
Counterpower Targeting," in Strategic Nuclear Targeting, ed. Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 160.
60Senate Armed Services Committee, Testing and Operational Requirements for the B-2
Bomber, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 21 July 1989, p. 9.
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TABLE 1
OVERVIEW OF DETERRENCE POLICIES
Era of Massive Retaliation
Postwar Doctrine
New Look


































SOURCE: Author and Richard Lee Walker, Strategic Target Planning: Bridging
the Gap between Theory and Practice (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1983), p. 8
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TABLE 2
TARGET GROUPS IN THE SOVIET UNION
1. Soviet Nuclear Forces:
ICBMs and IRBMs, together with their launch facilities and launch command
centers;
nuclear weapons storage sites;
airfields supporting nuclear-capable aircraft;
nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) bases.






tank and vehicle storage yards.
3. Military and political leadership:
command posts;
key communication facilities.
4. Economic and industrial targets:
a. war-supporting industry:
ammunition factories;
tank and armored personnel carrier factories;
petroleum refineries;
railway yards and repair facilities.






Source: Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization
for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, part 5, 96th Cong., 2d sess., p. 2721.
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weapons are not hard target capable and cannot attack mobile targets. But by
2008, all American strategic weapons will have the ability to threaten hard
targets. A question will remain, however, about the American ability to hold at
risk mobile targets. Given the problems encountered by the coalition forces in
quickly destroying the Iraqi SCUD launchers, despite coalition control of the
airspace over Iraq, it is hard to accept Air Force statements that the B-2 will have
the ability to hold mobile ICBM launchers at risk in Soviet airspace during a
nuclear war.
1. What Will Deter the Soviet Union in 2005-2010?
The Soviet Union probably will continue to undergo dramatic changes.
Political power will diffuse among the leadership of both the central state
apparatus and the republics as the republics strive for varying degrees of
autonomy or independence. The political power of the Soviet Union in 2005-2010
might be divided in a way similar in nature to that existing in the United States
during its confederation period. In addition, the Soviet population's desires, which
were released during the late 1980s and early 1990s, to develop some type of
modern and competitive market economy will likely continue. The restructuring
of the Soviet economy will place continued emphasis on the civilian sector and long
term economic growth. 61
These two factors suggest a reward and punishment approach for U.S.
national security strategy. The rewards could include foreign aid, trade
61 Michael Dobbs, "Russian President Calls for 'War' Against Soviet Leaders," The Monterey
Herald, p. 2A; Ann Imse, "Crowd Seeks Gorbachev Resignation," The Monterey Herald, p. 1 A, 10A;
and Interview between Roman Laba, Professor of Soviet and East European Studies, United States
Naval Postgraduate School, and the author, 14 March 1991.
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concessions or other nonmilitary means. Two potential punishments could exist.
The first potential punishment could be the threat of a strategic arms race to divert
resources away from the Soviet civilian economy. The second potential
punishment would consist of a nuclear strategy designed to threaten the assets
which the Soviet leadership values most. In this case, the Soviet Union's most
valued asset is its long term economic growth and modernization. Thus, the
targets in Table 2 to hold at risk are economic and industrial facilities.62
The major difficulties associated with targeting these facilities focuses
on the specific damage criteria and the methodological approach to measure that
criteria.63 However, these difficulties do not invalidate the worth of this targeting
strategy for both deterrence and warfighting. In case of nuclear war, the
destruction of Soviet strategic weapons was an objective which the United States
has planned to pursue because of the perception that both deterrence and
62This projection of a Soviet future is not a mirror imaging of American values and concepts
onto the Soviet Union. Instead it represents this author's conclusion regarding present trends
within the Soviet Union. According to Professor Roman Laba, the general consensus regarding the
best case future for the Soviet Union is one in which the republics have attained more political and
economic power while leaving some transrepublic issues, such as external defense, in the hands of
the central authority. The primary difference between this strategy and the Counterrecovery and
Countervailing Strategies of the Nixon/Ford and Carter/Reagan/Bush administrations is the object
of the threat. In those strategies, the object of the threat was the Communist leadership. In this
strategy the object of the threat is the leadership of the various republics and those that support
them by holding at risk the economic and political control which they have struggled to gain. For a
discussion of the Counterrecovery and Countervailing strategies see Ball, "Counterforce Targeting;
Bobbitt, "Selective Options and Limited Response;" Brown, "Newport Address," Department of
Defense, Annual Report, FY 1982, p. 40; Sagan, Moving Targets, pp. 39-48; Slocombe, "The
Countervailing Strategy;" and Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, p. 228.
63Michael Kennedy and Kevin N. Lewis, "On Keeping Them Down; or, Why Do Recovery
Models Recover So Fast?" in Strategic Nuclear Targeting, ed. Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp 194-208 and Desmond Ball, "U.S. Strategic Forces:
How Would They Be Used?" in Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, ed. Steven E. Miller (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 236-239.
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warfighting were enhanced regardless of the difficulties associated with attaining
such an objective.
A nuclear strategy emphasizing economic and industrial facilities is
applicable even in a prolonged warfighting scenario. Following the completion of
World War Two in Europe, Paul Nitze, then a member of the Strategic Bombing
Survey, concluded that:
...strategic bombing was likely to cause the greatest disruption if it
concentrated on basic industries and services such as oil and chemical, steel,
power, and transportation. Unlike the ball-bearing and airframe plants, these
basic industries, once severely damaged, could not be quickly restored to full
production nor could stocks be readily replaced.64
Nitze's views were supported by those of Hitler's economic Czar, Albert
Speer. Speer avoided placing plants for finished products underground because he
believed that the allied powers would then focus on the basic industries if denied
these other targets. Speer believed that the basic industrial plants could not be
replaced as quickly as those committed to finished products, that they were
inherently more vulnerable to attack, and if destroyed would have caused the
greatest disruption in the economy and the ability of the country to fight a
prolonged engagement.65
64pau i H. Nitze with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New
York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 35.
65Ibid., p. 36. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Overall Report (European War) 30
September 1945: pp. 25, 37, 108 further supports the views of Nitze and Speer regarding which
targeting would have had the larger impact on the ability of Germany to sustain its forces in the
field.
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2. How Much Will Deter the Soviet Union in 2005-201 0?
Unclassified numbers are obviously vague for the targets of concern.
However, some reasonable formulations can be made. A recent study performed by
Martin Marietta for the Department of Defense analyzed the post-START I target
base. Though the actual report has not been released, certain portions of it were
cited by Jane's Defense Weekly in its 22 April 1989 issue. The relevant targets are:
Priority 3 targets (Soviet War supporting industry): 1500 to 1600 targets
consisting of: nuclear weapons production facilities, power plants, hydro-
electric facilities, manufacturing facilities for critical components and military
hardware production facilities.66
This number is close to that cited by Desmond Ball for those economic and
industrial targets covered by U.S. strategic forces in a day-to-day alert posture and
is further supported by the study Strategic Arms Reductions .67 If the Soviet Union
converts most of the industrial facilities currently used for military related items
to non-defense use, a total of 1500 civilian economic targets could exist. This
number represents a "worst case" or upper limit. An equal number of strategic
weapons would be adequate to hold this target base at risk.
3. What if Deterrence Fails with the Soviet Union in 2005-201 0?
The three questions of deterrence are related and influence each other.
The answer to the question-what to do if deterrence fails?-influences how the
United States might continue to deter the Soviet Union. A range of targeting
66Barbara Starr, "Pentagon Studies 'Most Survivable' US ICBM Force Mix," Jane's Defense
Weekly, 22 April 1989, pp. 678-679.
67Desmond Ball, "Development of the SIOP, 1960 1983," in Strategic Nuclear Targeting, ed.
Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 81 and May,




options is required to allow the use of a few nuclear weapons up to the entire
strategic nuclear arsenal. Employment options should emphasize functional
groupings within the economic portion of the target base. Examples of targets
include hydro-electric facilities, petroleum refineries, or transportation choke
points. Geographic subsets of the functional options should exist as well to allow
targeting of specific facilities or functions within the various republics of the
Soviet Union. While emphasis is given to the economic-industrial realm, it is
foolhardy to not consider and evaluate other targeting options for Soviet nuclear
and nonnuclear forces.
C. STRATEGIC FORCES AVAILABLE FOR START II
The force structures evolving from START I will influence the range of
options available to the American negotiators for START II. Table 3 lists the
characteristics of strategic weapons the United States could posses in 2005. The
capabilities do not substantially differ from what presently exists. Ballistic
missile accuracy probably is at its technological limit with the Peacekeeper and
Trident D-5 missiles. Minuteman EL and lH missiles are not included because by
2008, the last of the aging Minuteman His (if any remain) are scheduled for
retirement.68
Table 4 lists those Soviet strategic weapons which could be available for a
START II regime. Soviet capabilities are projected to improve dramatically,
68General Accounting Office, Strategic Forces: Minuteman Weapons System Status and Current
Issues, GAO/NSIAD-90-242 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, September 1990).
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TABLE 3








(1000s of pounds) per sndv
ICBM
Peacekeeper 5900 .3-.4 .054 7.0-7.9 10
SICBM 5900 .475a .07 1.3 1
SLBM
D-5 6500 .3-.475 .065 5.3 5-6 b
BOMBERS WEAPONS CARRIED
BIB 4000-6000 Internal: 8 ALCM/ACM and 8
SRAMs, or 24 SRAMs
or 24 B-61 Bombs
External: 14 ALCM/ACM or 14
SRAMs or 14 Bombs
B-2 4400-6600 8 SRAMs and 8 B-83 Bombs, or
16 SRAMs, or 8 SRAMs and 8 B
61 Bombs
BOMBER WEAPONS
ALCM 1400 .2 .05 1
ACM 2200 .2 .02-.05 1
SRAM II 200 .2 .05 1
B-61 Bomb .1-.5 .07-.1





a. During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, General
Larry Welch, Air Force Chief of Staff, indicated that the yield of the SICBM is
larger than the Peacekeeper's. See House Armed Services Committee,
Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990-HR 2461: Procurement of Aircraft,
Missiles, Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Ammunition, and other
Procurement, 101st Cong., lstsess., p. 113.
b. The technical feasibility of downloading the D-5 missile to 5-6 warheads was
confirmed in testimony by Dr. J. D. Crouch, principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) and Rear Admiral
Kenneth Malley, head of the Strategic Systems Project Office for the U.S. Navy.
In addition, the Soviet Union has shown interest in a provision for downloading
in a START regime. See Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991, part 7, 101st
Cong., 2d sess., pp. 126, 129, 141.
SOURCE:
Senate Armed Services Committee, Department ofDefense Authorization for
Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, part 6, 101st Cong., 1st sess., p.
391; Congressional Budget Office, Trident II Missiles: Capability, Costs, and
Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 1986); Congressional Budget Office,
Modernizing U.S. Strategic Forces: Costs, Effects, and Alternatives
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, November 1987); The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1990-1991 (London: The International
Institute for Strategic Studies,1990); Department of Defense, Soviet Military
Power 1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990); Mark Lambert, ed., Jane's All the
Worlds Aircraft (Coulsdon, Surrey, England: Jane's Information Group, 1990);
Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems (Coulsdon, Surrey,




Donald Rice, "The Manned Bomber and Strategic Deterrence: The U.S. Air
Force Perspective," International Security, vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): pp.
125, 126; Thomas C.Cochran and others, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 1,
U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing
Co., 1984); Robert S. Norris and others, "Nuclear Weapons," in SIPRI Yearbook
1990: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University
Press,1990); Report to the Congress on the Analysis of Alternative Strategic
Nuclear Force Postures for the United States Under a Potential START Treaty
(Unclassified Version), (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 25 July 1989);
Robert S. Norris and Thomas B. Cochran, "U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Offensive
Nuclear Forces, 1946-1989," Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Paper 90-2
(Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, May 1990); and
Regina Cowen Karp, "US-Soviet Nuclear Arms Control," in SIPRI Yearbook
1990: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990), pp. 424-425.
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TABLE 4
SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS AVAILABLE IN 2005-2010
Delivery Vehicle Range Yield
(sndv) (nmi) (Mts)
CEP Throwweight Weapons
(nmi) (1000s of pounds) per sndv
ICBM
SS-18M4 5900 .5.55 .1.14 16.7 10 +
SS-18M5 5900 .75 .1-.14 16.0 10 +
SS-18M6 5900 16a .1-.14 16.0 1
SS-24 5400 .1-.55 .1 7.0-8.0 10
SS-25 5700 .55-.75 .1-.2 1.3-2.6 1
SS-18MOD 5900 .75 .05 16.0 10
SS-25 MOD 5700 .55-.75 .07 1.3-2.6 1
SLBM /
SS-N-20 4500 .1 .27-.3 >2.5b 10
SS-N-23 4500 .1 .27-.486 >2.5b 4
SS-N-20 MOD 4500 .3.475 .065 >2.5b 4
SS-N-23 MOD 4500 .3-.475 .065 >2.5b 10
BOMBERS WEAPONS CARRIED
Bear-H 3100-3500 12AS-15or 19X ALCMs




Delivery Vehicle Range Yield CEP Throwweight Weapons
(sndv) (nmi) (Mts) (nmi) (1000s of pounds) persndv
BOMBER WEAPONS
AS-15 900-1600 .25 .05-.25
AS-16 100 .35 .25
AS-19X 1600-2200 .25 .05
NOTES.
a. Throwweight places an upper limit on what actual warhead yield is. For
non-MIRVed systems, one pound of throwweight is roughly equal to one kiloton
of yield. For MIRVed systems, one pound of throwweight is roughly equal to .5
kiloton of yield due to the weight requirements of the post-boost vehicle and
other support equipment. In no case has the actual yield of warheads exceeded
that predicted by these ratios. See Peter Pry, 'The Strategic Nuclear Balance,
And Why It Matters" (PhD dissertation, University of Southern California,
1988), pp. 286-302.
b. No source consulted cited a specific throwweight for the SS-N-20 or 23. The
only information provided was that their respective throwweights are more
than that of the SS-N-18 which is cited at 2500 pounds.
SOURCE:
Author; Congressional Budget Office, Trident II Missiles: Capability, Costs,
and Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 1986); Congressional Budget
Office, Modernizing U.S. Strategic Forces: Costs, Effects, and Alternatives
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, November 1987); The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1990-1991 (London: The International
Institute for Strategic Studies,1990); Department of Defense, Soviet Military




Mark Lambert, ed., Jane's All the Worlds Aircraft (Coulsdon, Surrey,
England: Jane's Information Group, 1990); Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane's
Strategic Weapon Systems (Coulsdon, Surrey, England: Jane's Information
Group, 1990); Thomas C. Cochran and others, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol.
4, Soviet Nuclear Weapons (New York: Harper and Row, Ballinger Division,
1989).
especially in terms of SLBMs. This projection is based on the observation that
Soviet technical capabilities usually lag behind U.S. capability about by 10 to 15
years.69
D. U.S. FORCE STRUCTURES UNDER START II
To enhance deterrence U.S. nuclear forces will need the flexibility to carry
out the range of targeting options mentioned here. These forces should posses the
accuracy, reliability, range, survivability, and endurability to engage in a
prolonged confrontation. As shown in Table 5, many force options are possible at a
level of 1500 strategic weapons. But, a nuclear triad at this level of warheads is
not necessary to maintain national security. Moreover, with lower numbers of
strategic weapons, the allocation of warheads per delivery platform may have to
69Based on author's study of Thomas C. Cochran and others, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 1,
U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984) and
Thomas C. Cochran and others, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 4, Soviet Nuclear Weapons (New
York: Harper and Row, Ballinger Division, 1989).
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change from present configurations to avoid degrading national security. It may
not be in the best interest of the United States to place all of its nuclear eggs in too
few baskets and risk their loss. Not every force structure in Table 5 is consistent
with the joint statement on future negotiations issued at the Washington Summit
in June 1990 which states:
In the new negotiations, the two sides agree to place emphasis on removing
incentives for a nuclear first strike, on reducing the concentration of warheads
on strategic delivery vehicles, and on giving priority to highly survivable
systems. In particular, the two sides will seek measures that reduce the
concentration of warheads on strategic delivery systems as a whole. ..70
Despite the failure to meet these criteria, the force structures are listed for
purposes of comparison and analysis.
Table 6 lists several potential Soviet force structure in a START II regime.
The list is not as exhaustive as the table presented to evaluate the U.S. position
under START II. But, it does provide a means for the subsequent discussion.
While the analysis of this section shows that 1500 strategic weapons are
adequate for both deterrence and deterrence failure, the remaining issue concerns
how to deploy those warheads. The next chapter will evaluate the basing options
for the United States using the arms control criteria earlier developed.
70Joint Statement on Future Negotiations, 1 June 1990.
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TABLE 5
POTENTIAL START II U.S. FORCE STRUCTURES
MONAD Warheads/Launcher #s of Launchers
OPTION 1
Mobile SICBM 1 1500
OPTION 2
Rail Peacekeeper 10 150 (75)a
OPTION 3
Silo Peacekeeper6 10 150
OPTION 4






























Trident D-5b 5-6 360(15-18)a




B-2d 8 SRAMs and 8 Bombs 100-110
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TABLE 5 -Continued





































































































0-12 missile tubes disabled
NOTES.
a. The number in parenthesis represents the total of SSBNs or trains carrying
the missiles.
b. The United States and the Soviet Union apparently agree that two to three
SSBNs in overhaul or restricted availability in shipyards will not count against
the ballistic missile sublimits of START I. This portion of the START I regime
is assumed to carry over to START II. See Senate Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations Fiscal Year
1991, part 3, 101st Cong., 2d sess., p. 358 and Senate Armed Services
Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1991
,




c. The potential for disabling missile tubes in a START regime in a manner
agreeable to the Soviet Union has been indicated in testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Committee by Franklin Miller, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy. See Senate
Armed Services Committee, Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 1991, part 7,
pp. 87, 88.
d. To determine the number of PAA bombers subtract ten percent from the
number ofbombers listed.
e. No downloading of the Peacekeeper was assumed because no discussion of
this potential option was noted by the author in any official testimony before
the House and Senate Armed Services Committees during the 1980s. The lack
of testimony by Air Force and Department of Defense officials implies a belief
that the key to stability in reality is not the number of warheads carried per




POTENTIAL START II SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURES
MONAD Warheads/Launcher #s of Launchers
OPTION 1
SS-25 Mobile 1 1500
OPTION 2
SS-24 Rail Mobile 10 150 (75)a
OPTION 3
SS-25 Silo 1 1500
OPTION 4
































10 missile tubes disabled
224(16-21)a
0-4 missile tubes disabled
OPTION 10
Delta (SS-N-23)b 4 384 (24)
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TABLE 6 -Contin ued

































































































0-4 missile tubes disabled
45-55
NOTES.
a. The number in parenthesis represents the total of SSBNs or trains carrying
the missiles.
b. The United States and the Soviet Union apparently agree that two to three
SSBNs in overhaul or restricted availability in shipyards will not count against
the ballistic missile sublimits of START I. This portion of the START I regime
is assumed to carry over to START II. See Senate Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations Fiscal Year
1991, part 3, 101st Cong., 2d sess., p. 358 and Senate Armed Services
Committee, Department ofDefense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1991
,




c. The potential for disabling missile tubes in a START regime in a manner
agreeable to the Soviet Union has been indicated in testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Committee by Franklin Miller, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy. See Senate
Armed Services Committee, Defense A uthorization for Fiscal Year 1991, part 7,
pp. 87, 88.




IV. ASSESSMENTS OF FORCE STRUCTURES
This chapter will evaluate the American force options listed in Table 5 using
the arms control criteria defined in Chapter H. At the conclusion of this
evaluation, the results will be summarized.
A. VERIFICATION AND PREDICTABILITY
The verification system currently agreed to in START I is the most
comprehensive and intrusive regime in the history of Soviet-American arms
negotiations and provides the a model for START II. The verification regime at
present consists of five components.
The first is on-site inspection. Twelve kinds of inspections will exist in
START I. Examples include visual inspections of both bombers and warhead
packages on-board missiles. Procedures for these inspections were practiced by the
United States and the Soviet Union in the first half of 1990 to the apparent
satisfaction of both countries. Other aspects of on-site verification include the
monitoring of mobile ICBM and nuclear weapons facilities, observing the
elimination of weapons and their related facilities, and inspections of suspect
sites.? 1
71USACDA, "Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. and Soviet Proposals," Issues Brief (Washington,
DC: USACDA, 3 July 1990), USACDA, "START: Heavy Bomber Inspections," Issues Brief
(Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 29 January 1990); USACDA, "START: RV Inspections," Issues Brief
(Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 29 January 1990).
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The second is the use of satellites and other electronic systems, better known
as national technical means (NTM) of verification. Essentially NTM counts the
number of launchers and visually identifies their condition. Since NTM does not
require the observing party to physically enter the other's territory, it is a less
intrusive means of verification as compared to on-site inspections.
The third is a ban on on any practice that denies full access to telemetric
information including the use of encapsulation, encryption or jamming. During
the routine flight testing of missiles the telemetric information obtained by
another party provides such indications as missile accuracy, size and number of
warheads carried, and missile range and flight characteristics.
The fourth consists of information exchanges regarding the numbers,
locations, and technical characteristics of the strategic nuclear forces of the United
States and the Soviet Union. START I will require periodic updates of this
information through the newly created Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission (JCIC). The JCIC or its equivalent will carry over into START II.
The final component deals with mobile ICBMs. Once completed, START I
will set forth procedures for their deployment and the number of launchers
permitted away from garrison. In addition, mobile ICBMs will be identified
through the use of tags to minimize concern regarding the potential for rapid
reloads.?2 While several details remain to be resolved regarding mobile ICBM
verification, it is believed that these details will be resolved in START I in a
manner satisfactory to both sides and remain the appropriate model for START II.
WJoint Statement on the Treaty 1 June 1990, and USACDA, "START: Tagging Demonstration,"
Issues Brie/"(Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 29 January 1990).
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Taken together, the five components of verification will provide adequate
indications of Soviet compliance, or lack thereof, to START I and II. Through the
cooperation necessary to make the agreement verifiable, confidence, and therefore
predictability, regarding the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union will be
enhanced.
B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF GENERAL WAR
At the lower level of strategic weapons and the range of employment options
available, the effects of a war involving nuclear weapons would have a better
chance for limitation. The levels of devastation inherent in the past due to the
large levels of nuclear weapons need not exist. As former Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger stated before the House Armed Services Committee regarding
START I:
...if we can reduce the weight of a hypothetical Soviet attack against the
United States from lets say 3,000 megatons to 1,200 megatons, that while I am
not one who talks about the ease ofwalking away from nuclear war, it is better
from the United States' standpoint to reduce the weight of an attack in the
event that deterrence fails...73
By reducing the weight of a nuclear attack, the potential for lowering the levels of
death and destruction is enhanced.
73House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Strategic Forces and START, 100th Cong., 2d sess.,
16, 17 May 1988, p. 13.
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C. SECURITY OF ALLIES AND FRIENDS
In areas outside of Western Europe, as succinctly stated by McGeorge Bundy,
"there is no good role for strategic weapons.'"74 The American possession of
strategic weapons did not deter North Korea from invading South Korea, nor did
their existence prevent the downfall of South Vietnam, nor was Iraq kept from
overrunning Kuwait in August 1990. As suggested by William Kaufmann
conventional forces and the will to use them are a more credible and effective
deterrent outside ofWestern Europe:
If we show a willingness and ability to intervene with great conventional
power in the peripheral areas, after the manner of Korea, we will have a
reasonable chance of forestalling enemy military action there. 75
So, the success of extended deterrence outside of Western Europe is predicated
more on the general purpose forces which the United States can utilize in the areas
of concern.
Within Western Europe, the effectiveness of extended deterrence has not
depended on American strategic superiority. Bundy elaborates:
It has depended on two great facts: the visible deployment of major American
military forces in Europe, and the very evident risk that any large-scale
74McGeorge Bundy, "Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later: What has Changed?" in
U.S.Nuclear Strategy, ed. Phillip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory Treverton (New York:
New York University Press, 1989), p. 460.
75William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," in U.S. Nuclear Strategy, ed.
Phillip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory Treverton (New York: New York University
Press, 1989), p. 180.
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engagement between Soviet and American forces would rapidly and
uncontrollably become general, nuclear and disastrous.76
Therefore, two criteria will allow the continuing use of strategic weapons for the
extended deterrence of Western Europe. The first is the presence of significant
American general purpose forces combined with theater and battlefield nuclear
weapons. Based on current analysis the United States will have around two years
of warning time before the Soviet Union can launch a general invasion of Western
Europe. This time will allow the United States to reconstitute its forces in large
enough numbers and put them back into Europe before the Soviet Union can
launch a successful invasion.77 The second is the existence of enough strategic
weapons capable of carrying out an assured destruction attack. If both criteria are
met, successful deterrence in Europe against a Soviet attack will likely continue.
The existence of the START 13 formulated here is not likely to diminish the
security of the friends and allies of the United States.
D. CRISIS, ARMS RACE, AND BREAKOUT STABILITY
Before evaluating each force option according to the criteria of crisis
stability, arms race stability, and breakout stability, the parameters of the Soviet
attack on the United States which are relevant for evaluating crisis stability must
be established. Figure 2 lists the assumptions used in positing the retaliatory
capability of American strategic forces following a Soviet first strike. These
76Bundy, "Strategic Deterrence," p. 462.
77Department of Defense, Annual Report, January 1991, pp. 3, 5, 8. Obviously, this decision to
reconstitute forces in Europe will be subject to more than just military/strategic factors. The
domestic and international political and economic constraints in effect when the decision is
considered will play a significant part in whether U.S forces return or not.
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• Soviet forces attack from generated alert. The United States receives tactical
(30 minutes) warning only: it does not detect the attack until Soviet ballistic
missiles are launched or strategic bombers commence their penetration of
American airspace.
• Soviet alert rates (all options):
1.0 for silo-based and mobile ICBMs
.75forSSBNs
.95 for bombers
• U.S. alert rates (assumes attacked while on day-to-day alert):





1.0 for all ballistic missiles
.85 for American bombers
1.0 for Soviet bombers
NOTES
a. Assumes Rail Peacekeeper in garrison without continuous deployment.
b. As part of the Department of Defense's Major Aircraft Review completed in
April 1990, the alert rate for a 75 B-2 bomber force would be .55. For START
II this alert rate is assumed to carry over. See Senate Armed Services
Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1991
,
part 7, 101st Cong., 2d sess, p. 390.
c. For SSBN alert rate see Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea
Warfare) Memorandum, 'Trident Submarine Effectiveness," 22 June 1989.
Figure 2
Alert Rates and Penetration Probability Assumptions
for Soviet and American Strategic Forces
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assumptions represent a worst case approach and heavily favor the Soviets. This
approach is taken because the United States in a START II regime requires near
absolute certainty regarding the size of its remaining nuclear forces and associated
capability to retaliate against the Soviet Union.
1. Those Force Options Having Crisis Stability
The first force option having crisis stability is one consisting of 1500
mobile SICBMs. Studies performed by the Congressional Budget Office and
Congressional Research Service have addressed mobile SICBM vulnerability to
attack. For the Soviet Union to destroy 50 percent of a 500 missile mobile SICBM
force which reacts to only tactical warning, the attacking force would require
between 3000 to 4000 SS-18 equivalent (500 kiloton yield) warheads.™ For an
attack by the Soviet Union consisting of 1500 warheads against a 500 missile
mobile SICBM force, only 15 percent (75 missiles) would be destroyed.79 Other
studies indicate that a survival rate of 85 to 90 percent will exist for 500 mobile
SICBMs in the 3000 to 4000 warhead attack.80 For a 1500 missile mobile SICBM
force with adequate dispersal on present Minuteman bases and Federal
Reservations in the Southwest, the same degree of survivability is probable.
The second force option having crisis stability is one consisting of 1500
SICBMs in superhardened silos. To consider the threat to the silo-based missile
78Congressional Budget Office, Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces: Costs, Effects, and
Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: GPO, November 1987), pp. 55-58 and Steven A. Hildreth, Mobile
ICBM Choice: Military and Survivability Implications of the Bush Administration Proposal
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 25 August 1989), p. 15.
^Congressional Budget Office, Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces, pp. 49-55.
SOMichael Brown, "The U.S. Manned Bomber and Strategic Deterrence in the 1990s,"
International Security, vol. 14, no. 2 (Fall 1989): p. 12 note 16.
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force one must first look at the ability of the Soviet Union to hold at risk those
silos. Table 7 presents the single shot kill probability of the Soviet strategic
nuclear forces available in the time frame of the study.
With American silos only hardened to a reported state of 2000 psi, the
Soviet Union could theoretically destroy all 1500 SICBM in silo by using all of its
missiles. 81 Reality and the uncertainties associated with the Soviet attack
suggests that 300 to 750 SICBMs in silo would survive a Soviet attack. 82 Based on
the assumptions made regarding the future Soviet Union, it would achieve no
worthwhile objectives in this attack.
The third force option having crisis stability is one consisting of 1500
Trident D-5 warheads. With a 70 percent day-to-day alert ratio 1050 D-5
warheads would survive a Soviet attack.83 Furthermore, unlike the land-based
missile systems, a SSBN has the capability to defend itself against conventional
attack while at sea.
81 See the discussion of silo hardness in Peter Pry, "The Strategic Nuclear Balance, And Why it
Matters," (PhD dissertation, University of Southern California, 1988) pp. 277, 316-323, Senate
Armed Services Committee, MX Missile Basing System and Related Issues, 98th Cong., 1st sess.,
and Senate Appropriations Committee, Department of Defense Appropriations Fiscal Year 1986,
part 2, 99th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 501, 502, and 527. Even if the United States choose to superharden
(a factor of 25 or more than present hardness) its silos, a nuclear exchange could still favor the
Soviet Union because of the effects of crater kill. Crater kill results when a warhead's accuracy is
such that its target is located near or within the crater excavated by the explosion. A target, no
matter how hardened, can not withstand those effects. The crater radius (re) of a warhead is
calculated as follows: re = [(130 (Y)-3) /2], Y is yield in kilotons.the answer is in feet. The SS-18
MOD has a re of 473 feet and a CEP of 300 feet. The SS-25 MOD has a re of 473 feet and a CEP of
420 feet. See Pry, "Strategic Nuclear Balance," p. 271 and Chapter 5, notes 36 and 37
82750 strategic weapons survive when the Soviets target two warheads per silo. 300 strategic
weapons survive a 'perfect' attack from the SS-18 MOD with one Soviet warhead targeted per silo.
83Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare) Memorandum, "Trident Submarine
Effectiveness," 22 June 1989.
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TABLE 7
SINGLE SHOT KILL PROBABILITY (SSKP)aOF SOVIET STRATEGIC
WARHEADS AGAINST
5000, 7200, AND 25000 PSI HARDENED TARGETS
Weapon CEP Yield SSKP SSKP SSKP SSKP
(nmi) (Mts) 2Kpsi 5Kpsi 7.2Kpsi 25K psi
SS-18M4 .1-.14 .5 .57-.81 .37-.59 .30-.50 .14-.26
M5 .1-.14 .75 .67-.88 .45-.69 .37-.60 .19-.33
M6 .1-.14 16.0 1.0 .99-1.0 .97-1.0 .79-.95
SS-24 .1 .1.55 .43-.83 .26.62 .21-.53 .10-.28
SS-25 .1-.2 .55 .35-.83 .21-.62 .17-.53 .08-.28
SS-25 .1-.2 .75 .42-.88 .25-.69 .21-.60 .10-.33
SS-18MOD .05 .75 1.0 .99 .97 .80
SS-25 MOD .07 .55.75 .97-.99 .86.91 .78-.85 .49-.56
SS-N-20 .27-.30 .1 .06-.07 .03-.04 N.C. b N.C.b
SS-N-23 .27-.486 .1 .02-.07 .01-.04 N.C. b N.C. b
SS-N-20 MOD .065 .3-.475 .94-.98 .78-.87 .69-.80 .40-.50
SS-N-23 MOD .065 .3-.475 .94-.98 J8-.87 .69-.80 .40-.50
AS-15 .05-.25 .25 .15-.98 .09-.90 .07-.83 .03-.54
AS-16 .25 .35 .19 .11 .08 .04
AS-19X .05 .25 .98 .90 .83 .54
AS-19MOD .02 .25 1.0 1.0 1.0 .99




a. SSKP = 1.5* where * = (6XY ,2,3,)-(H ,i!/3,xCEP2 ). Y is yield in megatons; H is
target hardness in pounds per square inch; CEP is the distance from target
within which the warhead has a probability of falling 50 percent of the time.
For a detailed explanation of the formula see Congressional Budget Office,
Trident II Missiles: Capability, Costs, and Alternatives (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, July 1986), Appendix A.
b. Not calculated.
SOURCE: Author based on data in Table 4.
The fourth force option having crisis stability is 500 mobile SICBMs and
1000 Trident D-5 warheads. The 700 D-5 warheads at sea and a minimum of 400
SICBM warheads would survive an all out Soviet attack.
The next two force options having crisis stability are 500 mobile SICBMs
and 70 to 75 B-1B or B-2 bombers. 450 mobile SICBMs and 34 bombers carrying
over 500 strategic weapons would survive a Soviet first strike.
The final two force options having crisis stability are 1000 Trident D-5
warheads and 35 to 40 B-1B or B-2 bombers. Extrapolating from present
assessments, between 65 and 90 percent of the bombers on ready alert would
escape under a likely Soviet SLBM attack.84 700 D-5 warheads and 11 to 16
84Congressional Budget Office, Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces, pp. 99-110 and
Michael Brown, "The Case Against the B-2," International Security, vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990):
pp. 137-144.
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bombers carrying between 176 and 256 weapons would survive a Soviet first
strike.
2. Those Force Options Not Having Crisis Stability
The first set of force options not having crisis stability are those with 50
or more Rail Peacekeeper missiles. Without continuous deployment, the Rail
Peacekeeper would require seven to eleven hours of strategic warning to allow for
dispersal.85 The 'bolt from the blue' attack or the American failure to act on
strategic warning would result in a complete loss of the Peacekeeper at a cost of no
more than 40 to 50 nuclear warheads for the Soviet Union.86
In addition, Air Force and Department of Defense officials routinely
dismiss a nuclear attack with no strategic warning.87 It is important to remember
the context of the answer and its implications. In todays strategic environment, a
surprise attack does not prevent the United States from responding with
devastating numbers to a Soviet nuclear attack. However, in a world of 1500
nuclear weapons, strategic warning will matter a great deal.
In response to a question regarding the survivability of the Rail
Peacekeeper and fewer strategic nuclear weapons General John Chain, CINCSAC,
responded, "If the Soviets were weapons-poor, that might make it (the
Peacekeeper) a lucrative target.. ."88 Following a Soviet attack less than 750
^Congressional Budget Office, Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces, pp. 49-55;
Hildreth, Mobile ICBM Choice, p. 15, and Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, part 4, 100th Cong., 1st
sess., pp. 1891-1893 and 1931-1932.
86Author assumes three or four Peacekeeper trains per garrison with two missiles per train.
87Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Appropriations Fiscal Year 1991, part 2, pp. 351-
353 and Senate Armed Services Committee, Defense Authorization Fiscal Year 1991, part 7, p. 65.
88Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Appropriations Fiscal Year 1991
,
part 2, p. 353.
70
American strategic weapons will survive if that force option has 50 or more Rail
Peacekeepers.
The second set of force options not having crisis stability are those
options with 50 or more Peacekeepers in silo. 50 to 150 Peacekeepers in silo
present an inviting target. Even with two to three warheads targeted per silo, a
Soviet attack, depending on the force option, would leave the United States with no
more than 700 strategic weapons.
The next two force options not having crisis stability are 100 to 110 B-1B
or B-2 bombers. The most likely threat to the bomber force would come from
nuclear and nonnuclear SLCMs launched near the American coastline. American
Air Defense Forces require as a minimum an adequate Indication and Warning
(I&W) capability to scramble the alert bombers and defend against the cruise
missiles under development by the Soviet Union. At present American air defense
capabilities do not possess an adequate I&W or defensive capability.89 If even a
few cruise missiles are able to evade detection and strike the bomber bases, there is
a strong potential for the number of American strategic weapons surviving a
Soviet attack to be reduced below 750.
The next force option not having crisis stability is 500 SICBMs in silo
and 1000 Trident D-5 warheads. Following a Soviet attack only the 700 D-5
warheads at sea would remain.
The final two force options not having crisis stability are 500 SICBMs in
silo and 70 to 75 B-1B or B-2 bombers. An attack by the Soviet silo-based ICBMs
89Major G.E. Myers, "A Force Structure for Stability," in Dynamic Stability: A New Concept for
Deterrence, ed. LT Col Fred J. Ruele (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1987), p.
89.
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could destroy between 250 and 450 of the SICBMs and 30 to 35 of the American
bombers carrying some 500 strategic weapons.
3. Those Force Options with Arms Race Stability
The first three force options with arms race stability are 150 silo
Peacekeeper, 1500 silo SICBM, or a combination of the two. The Soviet Union
would have little incentive to pursue an arms race to counter either missile in silo.
But efforts could be made by the Soviet Union to improve the accuracy of its cruise
missiles. As demonstrated by the American cruise missiles in Iraq, highly
accurate missiles can have devastating results. However, an improvement in
cruise missile accuracy is a capability likely to be pursued in any arms control
regime due to the military benefits such accuracy promises in conventional
warfare.
The next force option having arms race stability is 500 mobile SICBM
and 1000 Trident D-5 warheads. All present statements and studies by Navy and
non-Navy sources indicate that the ASW problem will not be solved in a manner
such that submarines are easily threatened.90 At present, like the ASW problem,
a breakthrough by the Soviets to successfully target and destroy mobile missiles
with their aircraft or missiles is unlikely as demonstrated by the American
90Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare) Memorandum, "Trident Submarine
Effectiveness." For further discussion see the National Academy of Sciences, Naval Studies Board,
Navy -21: Implications ofAdvancing Technology for Naval Operations in the Twenty -First Century,
vol. 1, Overview (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988), Statement of VADM D.L.
Cooper, USN, Assistant Chief ofNaval Operations (Undersea Warfare) before the Subcommittee on
Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials of the House Armed Services Committee, 7 March
1990, (Washington, D.C.: Chief of Naval Information), and House Armed Services Committee,
Report of the Advisory Panel on Submarine and Antisubmarine Warfare, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 21
March 1989.
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experience in Iraq. The synergistic effects of these two platforms would compound
any breakthrough efforts by the Soviets.
The final two force options with arms race stability are 1000 Trident D-5
warheads and 35 to 40 B-1B or B-2 bombers. With the synergistic effects between
the SSBNs and the American bomber force, the need for the United States to build
up a continental air defense system is not as great. By facing the Trident D-5 and
B-1B or B-2 bombers the Soviet Union would have a choice of either focussing on
the ASW problem or keeping its air defenses robust to reduce the threat posed by
the American bomber force.
4. Those Force Options without Arms Race Stability
The first set of force options which do not have arms race stability are the
mobile SICBM, Rail Peacekeeper (if deployed), and Trident D-5 SLBM monads or
any combination of these three with silo-based missiles. With silo-based missiles,
the Soviet Union in effect need only counteract a monad because missiles in silo
are not a targeting problem. While the targeting of any of the mobile monad force
structures is a very difficult and currently unlikely endeavor, the reliance by the
United States on what is in effect just a single basing mode could provide
incentives for the Soviet Union to develop some type of breakthrough in systems or
weapons unconstrained by any agreement. While this area of arms control is
highly speculative and subjective, it is not in the best interests of the United States
to rely on any one basing mode for its strategic forces.
The next two force options without arms race stability are the 100-1 10 B-
1B or B-2 bombers. The impetus for an arms race would rest primarily with the
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United States and the difficult choice regarding continental air defense. To
provide even a minimal I&W capability against the Soviet bomber and cruise
missile forces would require a significant investment of funds. Obtaining an air
defense capability similar to that of the Soviet Union would require the United
States to spend substantial sums ofmoney.91
5. Breakout Stability
With the exception of only two force options, all others have breakout
stability. The first exception is 1500 silo SICBM. Using the throwweight to
kiloton thumbrule for MIRVed ballistic missiles, the SS-18 MOD could perhaps
add one to two more warheads per missile for an additional 150 to 300 warheads.92
For the SS-25 MOD, the Soviet Union could conceivably add one warhead per
missile for a gain of 1500 warheads. Because of the uncertainty surrounding
missile accuracy and the inherent vulnerability of silo-based ICBMs, the 1500
missile SICBM force option is not stable. The second exception is the 500 mobile
SICBM and the 1000 Trident D-5 warheads. The potential for breakout lies within
the area of ballistic missile defense. The ABM Treaty encompasses only strategic
ballistic missile defense, not tactical ballistic missile defense. The lack of specific
controls on tactical ballistic missile defense; for example, when does a tactical
91General John Chain, CINCSAC, testified before the Senate Armed Service Committee that
the Soviet Union has historically spent many times as much on air defense than the United States
has on its bomber force. This response suggests at least a four to one ratio of costs to provide a
significant air defense capability. See Senate Armed Services Committee, B-2 Bomber, pp. 25, 26.
In addition, the analysis by William P. Delaney regarding the costs for various levels of air defense
supports this contention. See "Air Defense of the United States: Strategic Missions and Modern
Technology," International Security, vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): pp 181-211.
920ne pound of throweight equals .5 kiloton of yield, see Pry, "Strategic Nuclear Balance," pp.
286-302.
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defense become a strategic defense?; creates the potential for the Soviet Union to
quickly modify those systems to defend against U.S. strategic missiles. The United
States could find itself unable to effectively retaliate by relying only on ballistic
missiles. For all other force options, breakout by the Soviet Union is either not
needed to threaten the survivability of American strategic forces or will have no
effect on the survivability of those American forces.
E. SELECTION OF BEST OPTIONS
The order of priority for selecting a force option is to evaluate first crisis
stability, then arms race stability, followed by breakout stability. The ideal force
structure would have a yes for each of them. Based on the results tabulated in
Table 8, the two best force structures are 1000 Trident D-5 warheads and 35 to 40
BIB or B-2 bombers.
With any of the three options selected the strength of nuclear deterrence is
maintained. However, the selection of a force structure such as 150 Peacekeepers
in silo would cause significant degradation to U.S. national security. If the
implications of a chosen force structure are not considered except in the light of
fiscal constraints or a quest for a peace dividend, the United States may find itself
facing the nightmare it has spent over 40 years preventing-nuclear war. The final
chapter will consider some implications ofSTART II.
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TABLE 8
CRISIS STABILITY, ARMS RACE STABILITY, AND
BREAKOUT STABILITY
Option Crisis Stable Arms Race Stable Breakout Stable
1500 Mobile SICBM Y N Y
150 Rail Peacekeeper N N Y
150 Silo Peacekeeper N Y Y
1500 Silo SICBM Y Y N
500 Mobile SICBM &
100 Rail Peacekeeper
N N Y
500 Silo SICBM &
100 Silo Peacekeeper
N Y Y
500 Silo SICBM &
100 Rail Peacekeeper
N N Y
500 Mobile SICBM &
100 Silo Peacekeeper
N N Y
1500 Trident D-5 Y N Y
100-110 B-1B N N Y
100-110 B-2 N N Y
500 Silo SICBM &
1000 Trident D-5
N N Y





Option Crisis Stable Arms Race Stable Breakout Stable
500 Silo SICBM & N N Y
70-75 B-1B
500 Mobile SICBM & Y N Y
70-75 BIB
500 Silo SICBM & N N Y
70-75 B-2
500 Mobile SICBM & Y N Y
70-75 B-2
50 Rail Peacekeeper & N N Y
1000 Trident D-5
50 Silo Peacekeeper & N N Y
1000 Trident D-5
50 Rail Peacekeeper & N N Y
70-75 BIB
50 Silo Peacekeeper & N N Y
70-75 B-1B
50 Rail Peacekeeper & N N Y
70-75 B-2
50 Silo Peacekeeper & N N Y
70-75 B-2
35-40 B-1B& Y Y Y
1000 Trident D-5
35-40 B-2 & Y Y Y
1000 Trident D-5
NOTES: Y = Option is stable; N = Option is not stable;
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study has projected a future core environment with the Soviet Union to
determine the lowest number of strategic weapons which can exist in START II
without lowering the deterrence threshold. The analysis indicates that 1500
strategic weapons are adequate to maintain the robustness of nuclear deterrence
and U.S. national security as it exists in 1991.
However, the key to successful deterrence at this lower level of strategic
weapons requires that the United States procure and maintain a survivable force
structure which is immune to any conceivable Soviet first strike or changes in the
political or ideological orientation of the Soviet leadership. A force structure
comprised of the Trident D-5 SLBM and B-2 bomber meets these requirements.
After implementation, a START II force structure comprised of the Trident
D-5 SLBM and B-2 bomber is a hedge against any changes in the condition of the
Soviet Union. First, if a civil war erupts inside the Soviet Union, then the United
States is better off with only 1500 strategic weapons inside that land. Second, if
the Soviet economic reforms are a success but its political reforms a sham, then the
ability of the Soviet Union to return to its previous expansionistic or aggressive
tendencies is at least partially contained. There are obvious political costs
associated with violating START II, the economic costs of entering into a strategic
weapons arms race are prohibitive, and there are no incentives to breakout if the
United States maintains a survivable force structure which is immune to the size
of the Soviet strategic arsenal. Finally, if the Soviet Union holds together and
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continues to progress towards some type of confederation, then the United States
benefits from the cooperation, confidence, and easing of tensions resulting from the
START process.
To maximize its negotiating flexibility and to hedge against a breakdown in
the START process or in U.S./Soviet relations before START II is implemented, the
United States should continue to modernize all three legs of the Triad. An
important question arises concerning the ability of the United States to stay
within fiscal constraints while modernizing its strategic forces. Table 9 presents
the costs for modernizing various portions of the Triad along with some
alternatives which serve as comparisons.
Historically, the United States has spent between 10 to 15 percent of its
Defense Budget on strategic forces.93 Assuming a decline, in fiscal year 1991
dollars, in the Defense Budget to $250 billion dollars by 1995, the United States
would have between $25.0 to $37.5 billion dollars available each year for its
strategic forces. This range of funds is sufficient to modernize and operate U.S.
strategic forces through the 1990s and maintain the robustness of nuclear
deterrence whether or not START II is negotiated and signed.
The costs to modernize and operate U.S. strategic forces in the 1990s are
summarized in Table 10. The modernization program should have five major
components. The first is the completion of the Trident D-5 program through the
18th SSBN. The second is the acquisition of the 75 plane B-2 program by fiscal
year 1997. The third is the deployment of the 500 missile mobile SICBM program
commencing in fiscal year 1997. The fourth is the remaining acquisition of various
^Congressional Budget Office, Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces, p. 2.
79
support programs including the SRAM II, ACM, KC-135R, and modifications to
the B-1B. Shifting the 50 Peacekeepers in silo to the rail mobile basing plan
should be canceled. Finally, there are sufficient funds available for the revamped
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. The Department of Defense estimates
that the reorganized SDI program, renamed Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes (GPALS), will cost 20 percent less than the Phase I SDI deployment plan of
1989. If so, this works out to an average of $5.6 billion dollars per year for the new
program.94 Total acquisition costs for U.S. strategic forces through fiscal year
2000 would run $83.3 billion and average about $10.0 billion annually. The
operations of U.S. strategic forces would average $9.9 billion dollars per year
through the year 2000. Taken together, this modernization program provides
flexibility while negotiating START II, acquires the most survivable and modern
strategic weapons while staying within fiscal constraints, and acts as a hedge in
case of a breakdown or failure in U.S./Soviet relations before START II is fully
implemented.
The START II formulated in this study was designed to maintain the
robustness of nuclear deterrence with the Soviet Union and did not consider the
other three major nuclear powers or any emerging nuclear powers. As the number
of strategic weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union goes
down, France, the United Kingdom, and the People's Republic of China have the
potential to become nuclear superpowers if measured by the total number of
94Department of Defense, Annual Report, January 1991, pp. 59, 60. For costs of the original
Phase I SDI program see Congressional Budget Office, Strategic Defenses: Alternative Missions and
Their Costs (Washington, DC: GPO, July 1989), p. xiii and Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization, 7989 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.:
Department of Defense, 1989), p. 4-2.
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strategic weapons each possesses. Does this have any negative effects for the
United States on crisis stability, arms race stability, or breakout stability? No.
The worst case for the United States is a coalition consisting of the Soviet
Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the People's Republic of China. Table 11
presents the projected force structures for the other three major nuclear powers in
the 2005 to 2010 timeframe. In effect, this coalition represents an instantaneous
breakout in strategic weapons. From a day to day alert condition, an all out
coalition attack would consist of 1100 to 1200 Soviet warheads and 1100 to 1200
warheads from the other three nations. For a U.S. force structure comprised of
1000 Trident D-5 warheads and 35 to 40 B-2 bombers carrying 500 strategic
weapons, 700 Trident D-5 warheads and between 176 and 256 bomber carried
weapons would survive an attack. The United States maintains crisis stability
with a strategic force comprised of the Trident D-5 SLBM and B-2 bomber and can
effectively retaliate against each of the aggressors holding at risk a variety of
targets. Arms race stability continues to exist because the same difficult choice to
concentrate on either air defense or ASW would confront the coalition.
A question frequently asked is whether the United States with fewer
strategic weapons can deter emerging nuclear powers and radical nations. But
deter them from what? A central strike against the homeland of the United States
or an attack against its interests overseas? Historically, high levels of strategic
weapons have not prevented thrusts against U.S. interests as demonstrated by the
Korean War, the Vietnam War, the taking of the American Embassy in Tehran,
and most recently the war with Iraq. Conventional forces remain the military
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instrument necessary to deter and defend against aggression in the peripheral
areas.
Will an irrational adversary launch strategic weapons against the United
States? Herman Kahn addressed this issue in the 1960s and his thoughts remain
relevant today:
Moreover we want to deter even the mad. It is sometimes stated that even
an adequate Type I Deterrent would not deter an irrational enemy. This might
be true if irrationality were an all-or-nothing proposition. Actually,
irrationality is a matter of degree and if the irrationality is sufficiently
bizarre, the irrational decision maker's subordinates are likely to step in. As a
result, we should want a safety factor in Type I Deterrence systems so large as
to impress even the irrational and irresponsible with the degree of their
irrationality and therefore the need for caution.95
In World War II Adolph Hitler did not use the chemical weapons which Germany
possessed against the United Kingdom most likely because the United Kingdom
possessed them as well. Furthermore, after he issued the orders to destroy
Germany's economic and industrial infrastructure in the closing days of the war,
many of his political and military subordinates, led by Albert Speer, counteracted
those orders whenever possible.96 If an adversary is completely insane or
irrational, no amount of strategic weapons will prevent his attack. If there is some
degree of rationality, 1500 strategic weapons are enough to create caution. In
addition, the continued funding of GPALS and its potential for deployment will
add to this caution.
95Herman Kahn, Thinking About The Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), pp. Ill,
112.
96Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battle (New York: Fawcett Popular Library, 1966), pp. 172, 173,
332-335.
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Other benefits are possible from the START process. Progress towards a
START II would demonstrate the commitment of the United States and the Soviet
Union to reduce the emphasis on strategic weapons. This commitment could have
benefits in the area of nuclear nonproliferation. Many nonnuclear nations have
threatened noncompliance or withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
unless the United States and the Soviet Union make progress in their strategic
nuclear arms control talks. In addition, the actions of the United States and the
Soviet Union could provide reduced incentives for non-NPT nations to acquire a
nuclear ability as well as placing increased pressure on the other major nuclear
powers to reduce their arsenals. Preventing further nuclear proliferation and
reducing the strategic arsenals of others is clearly in the interest of the United
States.
The result of fewer and more survivable strategic weapons will drive both the
United States and the Soviet Union to a targeting strategy which inherently
emphasizes assured destruction whether or not one or both nations believe in it as
a deterrent. While there are major difficulties in determining damage criteria and
the methods to measure that criteria, these difficulties are little different in their
degree from those associated with targeting the Soviet strategic arsenal under a
policy of Damage Limitation or the leadership of the Soviet Union under the
Countervailing Strategy. The difficulties of targeting the economic and industrial
facilities of the Soviet Union do not diminish the worth of this strategy as similar
difficulties did not diminish the worth of those targeting strategies. Targeting the
economic and industrial facilities of the Soviet Union is enough to deter in the
projected environment. Fewer strategic weapons are most likely enough even if
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the Soviet Union returns to its previous expansionistic tendencies due to the
political, economic, and military constraints which will be in effect by the time
START II is implemented. The recommended U.S. strategic modernization
program provides a hedge against failure in the START process until START II is
implemented while a START II force structure comprised of 1000 Trident D-5
warheads and 35 to 40 B-2 bombers carrying 500 strategic weapons maintains the
robustness of nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union and any combination of
the other present or emerging nuclear powers.
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TABLE 9
REMAINING COSTS TO COMPLETE THE BUSH/REAGAN STRATEGIC






500 Mobile SICBM 1 26.8 5.8 32.6
50 Rail Peacekeeper*1 6.0 4.4 10.4
100 Rail Peacekeeper6 15.7 8.9 24.6
18 Trident SSBNse 10.4 36.9 47.3
132 B-2s (July 1989)' 45.8 75.4 121.2
75 B-2s (April 1990)^ 34.0 44.5 78.5
97 B-lBs and 15-17 B-2sh 21.5 62.1 83.6
Optional Programs
1000 Mobile SICBM C 46.2 17.4 63.6
1500 Mobile SICBM^ 65.5 26.2 91.7
150 Rail Peacekeeper6 23.2 13.3 36.5
500 Silo SICBM 1 61.6 8.2 69.8
1000 Silo SICBM 1 123.3 16.4 139.7
1500 Silo SICBM 1 184.8 24.6 209.4
100 Silo Peacekeeper 29.2 1.6 30.8




a. In $ billions, fiscal year 1991, and includes research, development, testing,
and production costs which have yet to be spent on the program from 1 January
1991. The dollars from other fiscal years were converted to fiscal year 1991
using the conversion numbers in Department of Defense, Annual Report to the
President and the Congress, January 1990, Report to the Congress Fiscal Year
1986, and Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1983, (Washington, D.C.:, GPO,
1982, 1985, 1990). This figure represents the costs to complete and deploy the
system or modification and does not consider the funds already spent.
b. In $ billions, fiscal year 1991, the costs of operations, (including fuel),
maintenance (including spare parts), civilian and military personnel, training,
and direct and indirect base support for 20 years.
c. Estimate for procurement and O & S of the first 500 SICBM comes from
Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991, part 7, 101st Cong., 2d sess., p. 103. The
estimate for the next 1000 is the author's based on Ibid, and MX Rail Garrison
and Small ICBM: A Program Review, Report of the House Armed Services
Committee, 100th Cong., 2d sess., 21 March 1988, p. 9. The basing assumption
for a 1000 or 1500 SICBM deployment assumes half are based in the Southwest
and half on present Minuteman missile fields.
d. Estimate to put the first 50 or 100 Peacekeepers on rail comes from House
Armed Services Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1990-HR 2461: Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, Weapons and Tracked
Combat Vehicles, Ammunition, and other Procurement, 101st Cong., 1st sess., p.
113. Estimate for the next 50 is the author's. O&S costs are derived from MX
Rail Garrison and Small ICBM: A Program Review, Report of the House Armed




e. The procurement figure includes the cost to retrofit present Trident C-4
Ohio-class SSBNs to D-5 (total of eight) and procure enough D-5 missiles to load
out 18 SSBNs; See Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991, part 7, 101st Cong., 2d
sess., p. 87 and Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the
Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations Fiscal Year
1991, part 1, 101st Cong., 2d sess., p. 341. O&S costs are derived from Senate
Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989, part 4, 100th Cong., 1st sess., pp.
1941, 1942. The estimate assumes 11 SSBNs operational as of 1 January 1991
with one entering the fleet per year thereafter.
f. Estimate for procurement costs for a 132 B-2 bomber fleet are derived from
Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991, part 7, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., p. 386;
Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991, part 6, 101st Cong., 1st sess., p.
317; Senate Armed Services Committee, Testing and Operational Requirements
for the B-2 Bomber, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 21 July 1989, p. 50; House
Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense,
Department ofDefense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991, part 1, 101st Cong.,
2nd sess., p. 425; and Donna Cassata, "Bush will propose new defense budget
totaling $295 billion," The Monterey Herald, 2 February 1991, p. 8A. The figure
also includes $.9 billion for remaining KC-135R tanker modifications and $2
billion for the SRAM II program.
Annual O&S costs for a B-2 bomber fleet are the subject of intense debate.




Operational Requirements for the B-2 Bomber) to $16 million per aircraft
(Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991, part 1, p 827). At present the annual O&S
for the B-1B bomber fleet is $23 million per aircraft and projected to average
$17 million per aircraft over the lifetime of the program. Given the
technological leap which the B-2 represents an average of $22 million per
aircraft over the life of the program is not unreasonable and very likely
represents a gross underestimation based on prior Air Force statements
regarding B-2 program costs. Annual O&S costs for a 150 plane KC-135R
tanker fleet is estimated at $5.6 million per aircraft. See Testing and
Operational Requirements for the B-2 Bomber, pp. 48, 52; Michael E. Brown,
"The U.S. Manned Bomber and Strategic Deterrence in the 1990s,"
International Security vol. 14, no. 2, (Fall 1989): pp. 33-36 and Table 4, notes c
and d; Michael E. Brown, 'The Case Against the B-2," International Security,
vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): pp. 144-152 and Donald Rice, "The Manned
Bomber and Strategic Deterrence: The U.S. Air Force Perspective,"
International Security, vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): pp. 121-125.
g. Procurement costs for a 75 bomber B-2 program are derived from Senate
Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991, part 7, 101st Cong., 2d sess., p. 390.
Annual O&S costs are derived from note f above. However, the Air Force during
the major aircraft review stated that O&S costs for the B-2 would actually drop
to $8.0 million a year per aircraft; see Senate Armed Services Committee,
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991,
part 1, 101st Cong., 2d sess., p. 827. This author finds an estimate of $8 million
highly unreasonable for the reasons cited in note f. An estimate of $22 million




h. Procurement costs includes upgrading the B-lB's electronic systems and
modifications for future use as a cruise missile platform ($2.2 billion), the ACM
program ($5-7 billion), KC-135R tanker modifications ($.9 billion), and the
costs to terminate the B-2 program following fiscal year 1991 ($9.4 billion).
Annual O&S costs are estimated at $17 million per B-1B (97 aircraft) and $5.6
million per KC-135R (150 aircraft). B-2 O&S costs estimates are the author's
and expected to be a minimum of $30 million per aircraft because fewer B-2
bombers is likely to result in a higher per unit costs for specialized logistics. See
Congressional Budget Office, The B -IB Bomber and Options for Enhancements
(Washington, D.C: Congressional Budget Office, August 1988), p. 67; Senate
Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991, part 6, 101st Cong., 1st sess., p.
375; Michael E. Brown, "The U.S. Manned Bomber and Strategic Deterrence in
the 1990s," International Security vol. 14, no. 2, (Fall 1989): Table 4, notes c and
d, and General Accounting Office, Strategic Missiles: Uncertainties Persist in
the Advanced Cruise Missile Program, GAO/NSIAD-91-35 (Washington, D.C:
General Accounting Office, November 1990).
i. The estimate for procuring the first 500 silo-based SICBM and associated
O&S costs is derived from Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991, part 7, 101st
Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 103, 104. The estimate for the next 1000 is the author's.
This deployment option includes placing the missiles in superhardened silos.
The costs for silo construction alone is estimated to be $8.5 billion per 100 silos
and is derived from Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the
Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year




O&S costs for silo-based missiles have a wide variance. In 1982, the Air
Force reported that it cost $493 million annually to maintain the 1000 missile
Minuteman force. From Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991, part 7, 101st
Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 103, 104, the SICBM in silo would have an annual O&S of
$409 million to maintain a 500 missile force. The author used the most recent
estimate as the basis for both the SICBM and Peacekeeper O&S costs in silo.
See also Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, part 7, 97th Cong., 1st
sess., pp. 3992, 4002, 4337.
j. With the Peacekeeper's RDT&E essentially complete, this basing option
would require procurement, basing, and O&S costs. To procure an additional 50
missiles would cost $8.0 billion while procuring 100 missiles would cost $12.1
billion. See Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, part 2, 97th Cong., 2d
sess., p. 1048; Senate Armed Services Committee, Strategic Force
Modernization Programs, 97th Cong., 1st sess., p. 155; and Senate Armed
Services Committee, MX Missile Basing System and Related Issues, 98th Cong.,
1st sess., p. 170.
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TABLE 10
COSTS TO ACQUIRE AND OPERATE
U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES IN THE 1990s
Program Procurement8 Annual Operations
and Support
(O & sr
Trident D-5 10.4 1.85
75B-2 34.0 (through 1997) 1.65c
97 BIB Mods 2.2 1.65
482KC-135R .9 2.7
84 B-52 n/a 1.26
SRAM II 2.0 n/a
ACM 6.0 n/a
500 Mobile SICBM 26.8 .29 (starting 1997)c
50 silo Peacekeeper n/a .041




a. In $ billions, fiscal year 1991, and includes research, development, testing,
and production costs which have yet to be spent on the program from 1 January
1991. The dollars from other fiscal years were converted to fiscal year 1991
using the conversion numbers in Department of Defense, Annual Report to the
President and the Congress, January 1990, Report to the Congress Fiscal Year
1986, and Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1983 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1982, 1985, 1990). This figure represents the costs to complete and deploy the




b. In $ billions, fiscal year 1991, the costs of operations, (including fuel),
maintenance (including spare parts), civilian and military personnel, training,
and direct and indirect base support.
c. This figure is the O&S for a fully deployed program and represents the
maximum expected expenditure. In most years, actual costs would likely be
less.
d. This number is derived form the original SDI Phase I estimates minus the
20 percent expected reduction as cited in Department of Defense, Annual
Report to the President and the Congress, January 1991 (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1991), pp. 59, 60. The costs estimates for the Phase I SDI program,
according to the General Accounting Office, were optimistic. If so, then some
trade offs between strategic force modernization and GPALS may be required
depending on the priorities of the Bush and future administrations.
SOURCE:
Author from Table 10; Department of Defense, Annual Report to the
President and the Congress, January 1991 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), pp.
52-55 and Table C-l; General Accounting Office, Strategic Weapons: Long-
Term Costs Are Not Reported to the Congress, GAO/NSIAD-90-226
(Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, August 1990); and General
Accounting Office, Strategic Defense Initiative Program: Basis for Reductions in
Estimated Cost of Phase I, GAO/NSIAD-90-173 (Washington, D.C.: General
Accounting Office, May 1990).
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TABLE 11















TridentH 6000 .475 8(MIRV) 64/4 512
AIRCRAFT
Tornado GR-1 800















M4 2400-3000 .150 6 (MRV) 80/5 80
M45 3000-3600 .150 6 (MRV) a 48/3 288
M5 6600-7000 .150 12 (MRV)a 48/3 576
IRBM/ICBM
S4b 2000 .300 1-3 (MRV)a 33-36 33-108
M5b 7000 .150 12 (MRV)a 18 216
AIRCRAFT
Mirage 2000N 900

















CSS-N-3 2000 .2-1.0 1 48/4 48
IRBMs/ICBMs
CSS-2 1600 1.0-3.0 1 80 80
CSS-3 2900-4200 1.0-3.0 1 10 10
CSS-4 7800 4.0-5.0 1 10 10
AIRCRAFT
H-5 (Beagle) 1200 .02-3.0 1 20/20 20
H-6 (Badger) 3600 .02-3.0 1-3 130-390/130 130-390
total weapons 300-560
TOTAL WEAPONS-OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS 2162-2522
NOTES:
a. French warheads are currently assessed to lack a MIRV capability. But if so
desired, France could MIRV its strategic weapons given its technological
capability.
b. Possible replacements for the present S3 IRBM which is scheduled for
retirement prior to the year 2000. S4 yield could range from 20 to 300 kilotons.
SOURCE:
Robert S. Norris and others, "Nuclear Weapons," in SIPRI Yearbook 1990:
World Armaments and Disarmaments (New York: Oxford University Press,
1990), pp. 36-50 and Duncan Lennox, ed. Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems,
(Coulsdon, Surrey, England: Jane's Information Group, 1990).
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